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ABSTRACT 
In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally 
be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy 
by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from 
agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong 
minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and 
value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.  
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1. Introduction 
The desirability for corporations to engage in socially responsible behavior has long been hotly 
debated among economists, lawyers, and business experts. Back in the 1930s, two American lawyers, 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., had a famous public debate addressing the question: To 
whom are corporations accountable? Berle argued that the management of a corporation should be held 
accountable only to shareholders for their actions, and Dodd argued that corporations were accountable 
to both the society in which they operated and their shareholders (Macintosh, 1999). The lasting interest 
in this debate reflects the fact that the issues it raises touch on the basic role and function of 
corporations in a capitalist society.  
Two general views, often reflecting the issues raised in the Berle-Dodd debate, on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) prevail in the literature. The CSR good governance view argues that socially 
responsible firms, such as firms that promote efforts to help protect the environment, seek social 
equality, and improve community relations, can and often do adhere to value-maximizing corporate 
governance practices. As such, well-governed firms are more likely to be socially responsible. In short, 
CSR can be consistent with maximizing shareholder wealth as well as achieving broader societal goals. 
Some proponents of the good governance view further argue that firm value maximization can 
incorporate stakeholder value, not merely shareholder value (e.g., Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 
2013). The opposite view on CSR begins with American economist Milton Friedman‘s well-known claim 
that ―the only responsibility of corporations is to make profits‖ (New York Times Magazine, 1970, 
p.122). Extending this view, several researchers argue that CSR is often simply a manifestation of 
managerial agency problems inside the firm (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2014; 
Masulis and Reza, 2015) and, hence, problematic (the agency view). That is to say, socially responsible 
firms tend to suffer from agency problems, which are also manifested by managers engaging in CSR that 
benefits themselves at the expense of shareholders (Krueger, 2015). Furthermore, managers engaged in 
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time-consuming CSR activities can lose focus on their core managerial responsibilities (Jensen, 2001). 
Overall, according to the agency view, CSR is generally not in the interest of shareholders. Friedman 
even suggested that to think that business should do anything other than make a profit is to ―harm the 
foundations of a free society‖ (New York Times Magazine, 1970, p.122). Reality could lie somewhere 
between the good governance and agency views of CSR. Some CSR-related corporate policies can be the 
result of good governance consistent with shareholder value, while others can be driven by agency 
problems. 
The empirical literature testing these two views is mixed and thus has left the issues raised in the 
Berle-Dodd debate largely unresolved. For instance, a number of papers show that firm participation in 
certain social issues, such as not engaging with sin industries, avoiding nuclear energy, and charity giving, 
is associated with higher agency costs and lower shareholder value (e.g., Hillman and Keim, 2001; Brown, 
Helland, and Smith, 2006; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Masulis and Reza, 2015). In a recent study 
based on the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) dataset, which provides CSR ratings for thousands 
of public US companies, Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2014) find empirical evidence supporting the 
argument that managers of large US firms enjoy private benefits from investing in CSR. Meanwhile, 
other papers, largely using the same KLD data set, show that a higher CSR score is on average associated 
with lower idiosyncratic risk and a lower probability of financial distress (Lee and Faff, 2009), a lower 
cost of capital (Goss and Roberts, 2011; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011; Dhaliwal, Li, 
Tsang, and Yang, 2011; Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen, 2013), more positive sell-side analysts‘ 
recommendations (Bushee, 2000; Bushee and Noe, 2001), and higher abnormal returns and long-term 
post-acquisition returns (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013).  
The CSR empirical literature to date has two major limitations. First, much of the literature is largely 
focused only on the ex post effects of CSR. That is, the principal research focus is on measuring 
shareholder reactions to CSR as captured by abnormal stock returns (e.g., Dimson, Karakas, and Li, 
2015), the cost of capital (e.g., El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011), and ownership changes 
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(e.g., Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2014) or on the financial consequences of CSR spending (e.g., Lee and 
Faff, 2009). However, both the good governance and agency views are concerned to a significant extent 
with managerial incentives, which are ex ante in nature. In the agency view, the managerial incentive to 
engage in CSR is a reflection of the generally poor incentives of managers at socially responsible firms, 
i.e., these firms suffer from agency problems. These agency problems then manifest themselves in the 
form of, among others, CSR activities. In the good governance view, well-run firms, meaning firms in 
which management is generally properly incentivized, tend to have managers engaging in appropriate 
CSR conduct. In this way, the debate over CSR connects with the general corporate finance literature on 
agency problems and ex ante managerial incentives, a fact that we exploit in our empirical analyses. 
Second, the objective function of a firm is often implicitly assumed in the literature to be exclusively 
shareholder wealth maximization, without any independent importance being placed on third-party 
effects. In this regard, it is worth noting that in many countries firms are required by law or social norms 
to be concerned not only with shareholders, but also with other stakeholders, such as employees. Given 
differing opinions concerning the appropriate objective function within the literature, an important 
research question is whether well-governed firms are more likely to be socially responsible.  
In this paper, we take a comprehensive look at the CSR agency and good governance views around 
the globe. By means of a rich and partly proprietary CSR data set with global coverage across a large 
number of countries and composed of thousands of the largest companies, we test these two views by 
examining whether traditional corporate finance proxies for firm agency problems, such as capital 
spending cash flows, managerial compensation arrangements, ownership structures, and country-level 
investor protection laws, account for firms‘ CSR activities. While other studies using a within-country 
quasi-experimental approach (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 2012; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2014) 
focus on the marginal effect of variation in agency problems, our data and empirical setting enable us to 
examine its average effect. Based on this comprehensive analysis, we fail to find evidence that CSR 
conduct in general is a function of firm agency problems. Instead, consistent with the good governance 
view, well-governed firms, as represented by lower cash hoarding and capital spending, higher payout 
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and leverage ratio, and stronger pay-for-performance,, are more likely to be socially responsible and have 
higher CSR ratings. In addition, CSR is higher in countries with better legal protection of shareholder 
rights and in firms with smaller excess voting power held by controlling shareholders. Moreover, a 
higher CSR rating moderates the negative association between a firm‘s managerial entrenchment and 
value. All these findings lend support to the good governance view and suggest that CSR in general is 
not inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 identifies several proxies drawn from the corporate 
finance literature for firm agency problems and their possible relation to CSR. Section 3 describes the 
samples and specifications used when testing the views on CSR. Section 4 reports and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Agency theory and CSR: hypotheses 
Agency problems can manifest themselves through non-value-maximizing investment choices 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000) and managerial pay 
that is not tied to performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Economists have focused on possible 
mechanisms constraining these agency problems, such as contract design, incentive systems, and internal 
controls [see Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Prendergast (1999), and Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) for 
reviews], as well as on external mechanisms such as labor, capital, and product markets (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983) and institutional arrangements, including legal rules (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002). 
To assess whether CSR should be regarded as a manifestation of agency problems, we explore the 
underlying mechanisms based on ex ante managerial incentives, which connects the quality of corporate 
governance to CSR. In better governed firms, managers are better incentivized and their interests and 
behavior are more aligned with those of shareholders. If CSR is consistent with or improves firm 
performance, managers compensated for good performance have a greater incentive to engage in CSR. 
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That is, good corporate governance induces more CSR activities. In contrast, under the agency cost view, 
CSR is detrimental to shareholder value but is favored by managers as they are able to extract private 
benefits; i.e., bad corporate governance induces more CSR activities.  
We examine the relations between CSR and two ex ante incentive mechanisms of corporate 
governance, one on corporate financial policies that manifest agency problems and the other based on 
executive pay-for-performance. First, for the corporate financial policies analysis, we explore the 
hypotheses based on agency theory at the firm level in the spirit of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Jensen (1986), which has played a seminal role in the corporate governance literature (Morck and Yeung, 
2005). According to this literature, agency problems can be particularly acute when the firm generates 
substantial free cash flows in excess of those required to finance all positive net present value projects, 
leading to serious agency problems (Servaes and Tamayo, 2014). When liquid assets are abundant, firms 
do not have to submit to the scrutiny of the capital markets that occurs when new capital is needed, and 
the managers have discretion to invest the funds as they please. Because cash is the most liquid among 
all corporate assets, it provides managers with the most latitude as to how and when to spend it, and 
firms‘ capital expenditure decisions could be a channel of spending the abundant cash for empire 
building and private benefits extraction (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2009). Dividends and debt, given their 
demands on cash flow, can constrain managers from diverting cash or committing cash to unprofitable 
projects that generate private benefits to insiders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 
2000; Morck and Yeung, 2005; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). When cash is tight, managers 
are motivated to run the firm efficiently, which can increase shareholder value (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny, 2000). 
This literature focusing on free cash flow creating an agency problem suggests a causal effect 
running from corporate liquidity and leverage to managerial incentives to divert firm value. This leads to 
the following hypothesis reflecting the CSR agency view: A higher level of CSR is induced by higher 
cash holdings, free cash flows, and capital expenditure and lower leverage and dividend payout. This 
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hypothesis is consistent with the contention that CSR usually requires long-term investments that do not 
necessarily contribute to shareholder value maximization but do contribute to managers‘ private benefits 
of control (Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2014). In contrast, the CSR good governance view suggests the 
opposite: CSR should be associated with fewer agency concerns and better managerial decisions and, 
thus, with higher dividend payout and leverage and lower liquidity (cash and free cash flows) (Krueger, 
2015). This hypothesis is consistent with the agency theory in that, when cash is tight, the firm tends to 
be better governed as the manager is motivated or even forced to run the firm efficiently. Both 
hypotheses are based on the ex ante incentives of managers as identified in the corporate finance 
literature, i.e., the abundance or scarcity of cash can create bad or good managerial incentives. 
Second, we consider the agency versus good governance view from a managerial incentive-
performance perspective in the spirit of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and, hence, investigate hypotheses 
concerning the relation between CSR and managerial pay-for-performance. In the corporate finance 
literature, executive compensation is among the central issues in the debate about the effects of 
corporate governance as it helps align the interests of managers and shareholders (Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie, 2009), and a higher pay-performance sensitivity leads to less severe agency problems (and thus 
shareholder value-enhancement). Weak pay-for-performance sensitivity has been widely regarded as a 
major form of incentive misalignment and a symbol of bad governance (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2009), 
and it can be viewed as a proxy for agency problems in the firm [―pay without performance‖ as in 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003)]. Accordingly, the CSR good governance view would hypothesize that CSR is 
associated with stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity or lower excess pay, whereas the agency view 
predicts the opposite. 
CSR and agency problems can emerge simultaneously as they are both corporate choices. This 
simultaneity (or endogeneity) creates an empirical challenge for investigating the relation between CSR 
and firm agency problems. Several studies resort to policy and market-wide shocks as quasi-experiments 
to help identify a causal relation between CSR and agency proxies (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman, 
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2012; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2014; Flammer, 2013), but this approach is hard to apply in a 
multicountry context. Instead, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach by employing several 
variables exogenous to the focal firm‘s financial policies and agency problems as IVs for firm-level 
agency indicators. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. CSR data 
Our data provide information on both the legally mandated and the voluntarily initiated aspects of 
CSR. Our primary data on CSR are from MSCI‘s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) database and the 
Vigeo Corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) database. Both databases are built by 
means of different proprietary data sources and employ different rating metrics, which enables us to 
cross-validate our results. The IVA indices measure a corporation‘s environmental and social risks and 
opportunities, which refer to issues in which companies generate large environmental and social 
externalities and can be forced to internalize (future) unanticipated costs associated with those 
externalities. The ratings are compiled using company profiles, ratings, scores, and industry reports, and 
they are available from 1999 to 2011.1 Covered are more than 25 hundred companies included in the 
major equity indices around the world: the top 15 hundred companies of the MSCI World Index 
(expanding to the full MSCI World Index over the course of the sample period), the top 25 companies 
of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, the top 275 companies by market capitalization of the FTSE 100 
and the FTSE 250 (excluding investment trusts), the ASX 200, etc. For this large sample with global 
coverage, MSCI constructs a series of 29 ESG scores covering the following categories: strategic 
governance, which relates to traditional corporate governance concerns and whether the firm adopts or 
                                                 
1 The information on which the IVA ratings are based is extracted from corporate documents (annual reports, 
environmental and social reports, securities filings, websites, and Carbon Disclosure Project responses), 
government data (central bank data, US Toxic Release Inventory, Comprehensive Environmental Response and 
Liability Information System (CERCLIS), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), etc. (for European 
companies, the information is expanded by means of many other information sources), trade and academic 
journals included in Factiva and Nexis, and professional organizations and experts (reports from and interviews 
with trade groups, industry experts, and nongovernmental organizations familiar with the companies‘ operations). 
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has the ability to adopt certain strategic governance strategies; human capital, which concerns labor 
relations as well as employees‘ motivation and health safety; stakeholder capital, which concerns relations 
with customers, suppliers, and local communities; products and services that relate to product safety and 
intellectual capital product development; emerging markets, which focus on issues related to human 
rights, child and forced labor, and oppressive regimes arising from firms‘ trade and operations in 
emerging markets; environmental risk factors, which include environmental-based liabilities due to 
operating risks, industry-specific carbon risks, and performance in leading sustainability risk indicators; 
environmental management capacity, which includes environmental audit, accounting, reporting, training, 
certification, and product materials; and environmental opportunity factors such as the firm‘s 
competence in embedding certain environmental opportunities in its strategies.2 The rating then takes 
into account the extent to which a company has developed robust CSR strategies and demonstrated a 
strong track record in managing these specific risks and opportunities. A higher rating is assigned if the 
company has done better than its peers in one or several of the above-mentioned dimensions in its 
initiatives and risk management. Furthermore, we cross-validate the results utilizing the IVA ratings with 
analyses using the RiskMetrics EcoValue21 Rating and the RiskMetrics Social Rating scores, which are 
provided by RiskMetrics Group (now part of MSCI) and capture the environmental and social aspects of 
CSR, respectively.3 Companies in the sample are rated from CCC to AAA, which we then transform into 
numeric ratings from 0 to 6. The whole IVA sample (including the RiskMetrics ratings) covers 91,373 
firm-time observations from 59 countries.  
                                                 
2 A key ESG issue is defined as an environmental or social externality that has the potential to become 
internalized by the industry or the company through one or more of the following triggers: pending or proposed 
regulation; a potential supply constraint; a notable shift in demand; a major strategic response by an established 
competitor; growing public awareness or concerns. Once up to five key issues have been selected, analysts work 
with sector team leaders to make any necessary adjustments to the weightings in the model. The weightings take 
into account the impact of companies, their supply chains, and their products and the financial implications of 
these impacts, illustrated in Online Appendix Table OA1. On each key ESG issue, a wide range of data are 
collected to address the question: To what extent is risk management commensurate with risk exposure? 
3 The two ratings from RiskMetrics use similar methodologies as the IVA rating. Thus we combine them with the 
IVA ratings (and its constitutive sub-dimensions) and refer to this combined sample as the ―IVA sample,‖ which 
includes the overall IVA ratings. 
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The Vigeo Corporate ESG data set focuses more on CSR compliance, as it applies a check-the-box 
approach to rate how a firm and the country where it operates comply with the conventions, guidelines, 
and declarations by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Labor 
Organization (ILO), and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The 
Vigeo ratings cover six evaluation categories: (1) environment, (2) human rights, (3) human resources, (4) 
business behavior (which concerns the relations with suppliers and customers), (5) community 
involvement, and (6) traditional corporate governance. These six domains are further broken down into 
38 ESG criteria (sustainability drivers and risk factors) based on universally defined social responsibility 
objectives and managerial action principles. The indices used by Vigeo are Euronext Vigeo World 120, 
Euronext Vigeo Europe 120, Euronext Vigeo Eurozone 120, Euronext Vigeo US 50, Euronext Vigeo 
France 20, Euronext Vigeo United Kingdom 20, and Euronext Vigeo Benelux 20, and they are updated 
every six months. The whole Vigeo sample covers 7,048 firm-time observations from 28 countries and 
36 sectors. Both the MSCI sample and the Vigeo sample cover the well-established equity indices of the 
largest companies across the world, not just a specific sample of firms that engage in CSR. Unlike the 
MSCI IVA ratings, which are based on a scale of 0 to 6 (CCC to AAA), the Vigeo ESG ratings are given 
on a scale of 0 to 100. As all of the sample firms are listed and included in the major global equity indices, 
our empirical results mostly speak of the relations between CSR and corporate governance (or agency 
problems) in the world‘s largest corporations.  
For both the MSCI and Vigeo samples, firms are rated relative to their industry peers from both 
domestic and international markets. Thus, the ratings do not depend on the cross-country differences in 
jurisdiction, regulation, and the local CSR situation. This makes our cross-country data more credible 
and helps guarantee that our CSR ratings are not biased by country-specific characteristics. In addition, 
we triangulate the results using our public and proprietary CSR data by using the ASSET4 data from 
Thomson Reuters, which also have global coverage and a similar rating method (by adopting a global 
industry peer comparison). The detailed descriptions of the MSCI IVA and the Vigeo ESG samples are 
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shown in the Online Appendix Table 0A1 and 0A2, and their country distributions (as well as that of 
ASSET4) are shown in Online Appendix Tables OA3. 
 
3.2. Empirical strategy 
Our empirical strategy is to test the effects of proxies for agency problems on CSR. Bae, Kang, and 
Wang (2011) state, in line with Jensen (1986), that firms with significant free cash flow but few 
investment opportunities are more likely to invest beyond the optimal level and that dividends and debt 
serve as disciplinary mechanisms to prevent managers from wasting free cash. Based on our earlier 
discussion of the academic literature, we utilize five agency proxies (putting aside for the moment 
managerial compensation): (1) capital expenditure (CapEx); (2) cash holdings; (3) free cash flow 
measured as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) after the change in net assets (CapEx, minus 
depreciation and amortization, plus or minus the change in net working capital); (4) dividend payout 
ratio; and (5) leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt over total equity. Higher values of the first 
three variables (1-3) can be an indication of agency costs, especially for large and mature multinational 
firms as in our sample, and higher values of the last two (4 and 5) relate to mechanisms that can curb 
managerial agency problems.  
The issue of endogeneity is, as always, important, which is why we take an instrumental variable 
approach. In the spirit of Lin, Ma, Malatesta and Xuan (2011) and Laeven and Levine (2009), we use the 
industry peers‘ average financial policies as IVs for firm-level financial policies. We take the within-
sample arithmetic means of each of our five financial policies variables (agency indicators) by country, by 
industry, and by year (country-industry-year average). The use of industry peers‘ average financial 
policies as IVs for a focal firm‘s financial policies can be justified in several ways. First, ample evidence 
exists that a firm‘s financial policies are affected by the policies of its peer firms. According to Leary and 
Roberts (2014), peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously 
identified determinants. Such peer effects are also found in corporate precautionary cash holdings (e.g., 
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Hoberg and Phillips, 2014), corporate investment decisions (Cheng, 2011; Foucault and Fresard, 2014), 
and earnings fraud and other types of financial misconduct (Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman, 2014).  
Second, little reason exists to believe that a firm‘s CSR practice is affected by its peer firms‘ financial 
policies through channels other than influencing its own financial policies. Even if there were channels 
other than the focal firm‘s own financial policies, we attempt to take that into account by controlling for 
firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. 
We use the within-sample industry peers‘ average financial policies, instead of the financial 
policies of country-wide industry peers, as our IVs, because our sample firms are mostly large and 
mature companies that are listed in major global equity indices such as the MSCI World Index and, 
therefore, are comparable in size and tend to benchmark their financial policies to other large companies 
such as those in our sample. It is less likely the case that an industry leader‘s cash holdings and capital 
structure are determined by the average cash holdings and capital structure of all the firms in its country 
and industry (as most of these firms would be smaller and less internationally active). On average, each 
firm has 49 peers (firms without peers are dropped from the IV analysis). We also check the robustness 
of our IV results by using alternative dependent variables, alternative CSR samples, and an alternative IV 
that captures other aspects of the agency problems.  
Higher cash holdings, free cash flows, and capital expenditures do not necessarily reflect higher 
agency costs as long as there are sufficient growth and investment opportunities. The argument Jensen 
(1986) makes is that firms with larger free cash flow but with limited investment opportunities can suffer 
from the agency problem of misusing corporate funds. Therefore, we control for investment 
opportunities proxied by Tobin‘s q (market-to-book ratio of assets) in all our regressions. Also, although 
each agency indicator has some non-agency dimensions—for example, higher cash holdings can signify 
higher profitability resulting from better past investments—our key argument is that they can induce 
managerial incentives in relation to seeking private benefits by engaging in costly CSR activities. We 
therefore lag all independent variables (including the IVs) by one year. Moreover, it is important to 
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interpret our empirical results collectively. That is, although a cash holdings variable or leverage ratio in 
isolation can represent different aspects of corporate policy and profitability other than the degree of 
agency problems, the consistency of the signs of all five potential agency indicators can provide a good 
indication of whether CSR in general is induced by agency problems or by good governance.  
Turning to managerial compensation, we test the relation between CSR and managerial pay-for-
performance by regressing CSR on a pay-performance sensitivity variable, along with other firm-level 
and country-level covariates. In the literature, executive compensation is usually measured by the sum of 
cash-based pay (salaries and bonuses) and equity-based pay (stock options, restricted stocks, and payouts 
from long term incentive plans), and gauging executive pay-for-performance based on a single 
compensation dimension is difficult as both types of compensation are benchmarked to different types 
of firm performance. Furthermore, the relative use of these types of compensation has changed 
considerably over time (Frydman and Jenter, 2010), which is why we focus on total compensation and 
relate it to the total share performance benchmark. A standard way of measuring a firm‘s pay-for-
performance is by estimating the sensitivity of the change of executive compensation to the change of 
firm performance [e.g., return on assets (ROA) or Tobin‘s q) over a long time series, which is captured 
by the beta coefficient on the compensation variable for each individual firm (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). 
However, this approach is not feasible in our setting with companies from around the world, as we do 
not have long-enough time series data on their executive compensation. In addition, the validity of 
measuring executive incentives by pay-performance sensitivity is debatable, because fractional equity 
ownership [the dollar change in chief executive officer (CEO) wealth for one dollar change in firm value; 
Jensen and Murphy (1990)] and equity-at-stake [the dollar change for 1% change in firm value; Hall and 
Liebman (1998)] usually yield conflicting results for US samples (Frydman and Jenter, 2010), let alone 
for international samples. Moreover, using sensitivity measures estimated from regressing pay on 
performance (or vice versa) can lead to spurious correlations because the performance variable could 
already incorporate the effect of CSR. As these concerns restrain us from using the traditional measures 
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of pay-for-performance as a proxy for managerial incentives, we use two alternative pay-for-performance 
measures.  
First, we use Thomson Reuter‘s ASSET4 variable CEO Compensation Link to Total Shareholder Return, 
which is a dummy variable indicating whether managerial compensation is linked to total shareholder 
return (TSR) and is based on the combination of textual analysis of a company‘s annual report and 
media coverage of executive compensation issues. In the annual report, a company usually includes a 
remuneration report or a compensation discussion and analysis, which contains information through 
which Thomson Reuters tracks whether specific return-based performance benchmarks are set and 
whether the CEO compensation is linked to TSR. If Thomson Reuters finds in the above sources 
evidence that the executive top management has TSR as a performance criterion (performance target), 
then a one is assigned to the pay-for-performance variable and zero otherwise. We acknowledge that this 
dummy variable is a crude proxy for pay-for-performance, but it is a relatively objective indicator that 
captures the ex ante managerial incentives of engaging in CSR (a performance benchmark is clearly an ex 
ante mechanism) and can be applied to international samples without long time series. 
The typical endogeneity concern that emerges is that stronger pay-for-performance is a result of 
higher levels of CSR or that CSR and pay-for-performance are jointly determined by other firm-level 
factors. To address this endogeneity concern, we again employ an instrumental variable approach, by 
using IVs for our pay-for-performance measure. The IVs we select are mostly related to board structures 
(collected from Datastream) and have been shown in the literature to be key determinants of executive 
pay-for-performance: the percentage of independent board members as reported by the company 
[Percent independent board members]; the percentage of independent compensation committee 
members [Compensation committee independence]; and a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO 
simultaneously chairs the board [CEO-chairman duality]. Here, independent board members are 
directors who are not employed by the company, have not served as an executive board member in the 
firm for at least ten years, are not or do not represent a reference shareholder with more than 5% of the 
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equity, do not hold cross-board memberships, have no recent or immediate family ties to executive and 
nonexecutive directors of the company, and do not accept any compensation other than fees for board 
service. We cross-validate the information (e.g., board members‘ identities and status such as executive 
versus non-executive) by manually checking the director reports of the BoardEx database in each year of 
our sample and correct mistakes.  
We use the above-mentioned variables as our IVs because, on the one hand, stronger pay-for-
performance sensitivity has been shown to be steered by board independence (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2009; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011) and, on the other hand, no reason exists to believe 
that a firm‘s CSR is directly related to board independence (especially the measure related to 
compensation committee independence) through channels other than managerial pay-for-performance. 
Even if one is still concerned that CSR is related to board structure and independence, which can create 
an omitted variable bias, those channels should be taken into account by controlling for firm fixed 
effects, as board structures are mostly stable over time and are mainly changed by regulations (Linck, 
Netter, and Yang, 2012), and the identification mostly comes from cross-sectional (instead of time series) 
variations of board structures. Hence, time-invariant mechanisms induced by board structures should be 
captured by firm fixed effects. We do not use industry peers‘ pay-for-performance measures as IVs, 
which is different from what we have done for financial policies as agency indicators. The reason is that, 
in the literature, the overall evidence for the effective use of relative performance evaluation (relative to 
an industry benchmark) is weak (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  
Second, we estimate excess pay (or abnormal pay) from a typical CEO compensation regression, 
which captures the degree to which CEO compensation is not explained by firm performance and 
general firm characteristics in a first stage and then relate this predicted excess pay to the company‘s CSR 
level in a second stage. Excess pay can reflect the occurrence of agency problems (or the quality of 
governance) within a company as it regards the lack of performance-driven incentives. We adopt this 
approach but are mindful of the fact that several firm and CEO characteristics can explain both excess 
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pay of the CEO and the firm‘s CSR level. Therefore, we control not only for a set of CEO and firm 
characteristics, but also for firm and time fixed effects in both stages. We collect the yearly CEO 
compensation from Datastream (ASSET4‘s corporate governance pillar) and cross-validate the data with 
BoardEx‘s director reports. We add the data on the CEO and boards (CEO-chairman duality, 
independence of the compensation committee, board size, independence of board members, whether or 
not say-on-pay is sought) from Datastream and BoardEx, blockholder ownership data from Orbis, and 
other firm characteristics from Compustat and Datastream. In the first stage, we estimate a typical pay-
performance model by regressing the logarithm of the CEO‘s total compensation on the previous year‘s 
Tobin‘s q, along with the above CEO, board, governance, and firm characteristics variables [following 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) and Peters and Wagner (2014)], as well as firm and time fixed 
effects. We call the residual of this regression ―excess pay‖ as it captures the component of CEO‘s total 
compensation that is predicted neither by firm performance measures nor by other well-documented 
CEO and firm attributes (including governance). Excess pay thus represents that part of CEO pay that is 
not tied to performance. We use this predicted pay residual as a proxy for the degree of deviation from 
the expected pay-for-performance, that is, as a proxy for poor governance. The larger this residual, the 
greater the incentive misalignment for the CEO. In the second stage, we regress the CSR rating on the 
one-year-lagged excess pay and other control variables [firm size, the largest shareholder‘s cash flow 
rights, ROA, Tobin‘s q, interest coverage, current ratio, the logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, and a country-level globalization index], as well as firm and time fixed effects. The agency 
cost view on CSR predicts a positive coefficient on Excess Pay in the second stage, because the larger the 
excess pay, the more severe the agency problems are expected to be for the CEO because he could then 
engage in non-performance-enhancing CSR activities. The good governance view predicts the opposite. 
That is, when the excess pay is zero or small, a CEO is more likely to carry out value-consistent or value-
enhancing CSR activities.  
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In robustness tests, we replace firm fixed effects with industry fixed effects in all regressions to 
validate our results. The descriptive statistics of the variables mentioned above for different samples (the 
MSCI IVA sample, the Vigeo ESG sample, and the ASSET4 ESG sample) are provided in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Results on agency indicators 
4.1.1. Baseline IV results 
In Table 2, we examine the relation between CSR and our five agency proxies: cash holdings, free 
cash flow, CapEx, dividend payout ratio, and leverage. The agency view predicts a positive relation 
between CSR and the first three proxies and a negative one for the last two. The good governance view 
on CSR predicts the opposite. 
The five proxies are instrumented by the corresponding within-sample firm-level industry peers‘ 
financial policies. One important note is that the correlations between the five industry-peer proxies are 
not high, ranging from -0.8% to 23% for both the MSCI IVA and the Vigeo ESG sample companies, 
which suggests that the five financial policies variables capture agency problems from different angles 
and that we are thus not measuring the same relation in each of the five models. In the second stage, 
CSR ratings are regressed on the five predicted agency proxies as estimated from the first stage and on 
the other control variables with bootstrapping-adjusted standard errors. We report regression results for 
both stages; all independent variables are lagged.  
In the first stage, industry peers‘ cash holdings, free cash flow, capital expenditures, dividend ratio, 
and leverage are all positively and significantly correlated with the focal firm‘s cash holdings, free cash 
flow, capital expenditures, dividend ratio, and leverage, respectively, as is evident in Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 
and 9. The Cragg-Donald f-test statistics are all higher than the critical value of 16.38%, with P-values 
smaller than 0.01 in all specifications. This is essentially a test for the weak instrument hypothesis (testing 
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for the relevance of the IV in the first stage), and a higher test statistic (low P-value) indicates a rejection 
of the null of a weak instrument. These positive and significant correlations as well as the high F-
statistics suggest that our IVs are strongly correlated with our endogenous variables, supporting the 
relevance criterion of our IVs.  
In the second stage, the coefficients of the three liquidity-focused agency proxies (cash holdings, 
free cash flows, and capital expenditures) are all negative and statistically significant above the 95% 
confidence level, while the coefficients on the financial constraint-focused agency proxies (dividend 
payouts and leverage) are both significantly positive. The point estimate for cash holdings as a 
percentage of total assets is -0.0127, indicating that a one standard deviation increase in cash holdings as 
a percentage of total assets (8.6%) is associated with a 0.11 (-0.0127 × 8.6) decrease in the overall IVA 
rating or 4% lower at the mean score (0.11 / 2.8). The point estimates for the other agency indicators 
have similar magnitudes, and, given that we use an IV approach, they can be interpreted as local average 
treatment effects (LATE). All these findings therefore do not support the CSR agency view. In addition, 
financial slack (as measured by the current ratio) and, to some extent, the financial constraint proxy 
(interest coverage) are mostly positively associated with the ESG ratings, which likewise do not provide 
support for the CSR agency costs perspective. We confirm that firms with higher CSR ratings are larger 
firms with more concentrated ownership, located in countries that are richer (in terms of GDP per 
capita) and more globalized (as captured by the globalization index). In terms of causation, the 
interpretation of these results ought to be done with care. Given our identification strategy, we tend to 
interpret them as follows. Well-governed firms suffer less from agency concerns. When cash is tight 
(lower cash reserves, free cash flows and capital spending, and higher dividend payouts and interest 
payouts), managers are motivated to run the firm more efficiently and care more about the long run. 
This is consistent with engaging in CSR activities. 
 
4.1.2. Alternative IVs 
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To check the robustness of our previous results relating the level of CSR to various agency 
indicators, we conduct several additional tests using alternative IVs and CSR indicators. First, we replace 
the industry peers‘ average financial policies, which we used as IVs, by a combination of the existence of 
a poison pill and a classified board within a firm, and conduct similar two stage least squares (2SLS) tests. 
The reasons that we combine these antitakeover mechanisms are twofold. First, whenever the use of a 
poison pill is legally allowed, the combination of the poison pill and a classified board is the most 
effective defense available to a target company and, hence, most likely to entrench its management 
(Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, 2002). Second, antitakeover provisions are usually regulated by laws, 
and their prevalence varies across countries. For example, while the poison pill is widely used in US 
companies and can be triggered by the directors, the mandatory business neutrality rule in the United 
Kingdom does not allow directors to activate a poison pill but requires that the shareholders decide on 
accepting or rejecting a takeover bid (Davies, Schuster, and Van de Walle de Ghelcke, 2010; Enriques, 
Gilson, and Pacces, 2014). In connection with the use of this variable as a robustness check, a significant 
fraction of our firm-year observations are from the United States and the United Kingdom (see Online 
Appendix Tables OA3 and OA4).  Hence, the combining of these two mechanisms into one broader 
mechanism is more suitable for our cross-country setting. Managerial entrenchment enhanced by 
antitakeover provisions can amplify the agency problems in a firm, which can be directly manifested by 
the firm‘s cash flows and payout policies. There is no reason to believe, however, that the decision to 
engage in CSR is influenced by the likelihood of a firm being taken over, except via the channel of its 
financial policies induced by agency problems.  
Table 3 shows the results using the existence of a poison pill and a classified board as alternative 
IVs. We report the coefficients on the five agency indicators only in the second stage for conciseness, 
but the model specification is essentially the same as that in Table 2. The results are consistent with our 
previous findings. The (instrumented) indicators of cash holdings, free cash flows, and CapEx are all 
negatively correlated with the aggregate CSR score, and the (instrumented) indicators of dividend payout 
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and leverage ratio are positively correlated with CSR. The coefficients are significant within the 5% level 
for CapEx and dividend payout and within the 10% for cash holdings and leverage.   
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
4.1.3. Alternative dependent variables 
As an additional robustness check, we replace the dependent general CSR variable in Table 2 by the 
RiskMetrics EcoValue Rating (CSR focusing on ecological efficiencies) and the RiskMetrics Social Rating 
(CSR focusing on social issues), and we conduct similar tests as in the baseline results by using industry 
peers‘ average financial policies as IVs. These two sub-dimensional ratings use similar metrics as the IVA 
rating, and they measure two important, but different, aspects of CSR: a firm‘s environmental impact 
and social impact (the IVA rating gauges a firm‘s overall CSR engagement, which also includes other 
dimensions). The results of using these two alternative dependent variables are reported in Table 4, with 
Panel A showing results for the EcoValue Rating and Panel B for the Social Rating. We report the 
coefficients of the five (predicted) agency indicators only in the second stage for reasons of conciseness, 
but all first-stage F-tests satisfy the relevance criteria of IV. In Panel A, three out of the five agency 
indicators (free cash flows, CapEx, and dividend payout) are significant at the 1% level and have signs 
consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3. In Panel B, four out of five agency indicators (cash, free cash 
flows, CapEx, and the leverage ratio) are significant at the 99% confidence level with consistent signs. 
The economic magnitudes are also similar to those in Table 2. In unreported analysis, we also replace the 
dependent variables by the three sub-indices that receive the highest weights in the general IV index 
(Labor Relations, Industry-specific Carbon Risks, and Environmental Opportunities) and three aggregate sub-
scores [Strategic Governance (including traditional governance), Human Capital, and Stakeholder Capital], and 
similar results are obtained. Again, using these alternative dependent variables yields results consistent 
with the good governance view, not the agency view, on CSR. 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
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4.1.4. Alternative CSR sample 
We also turn to an alternative CSR sample, the Vigeo Corporate ESG sample, to further cross-
validate our results. The Vigeo Corporate ESG data set focuses more on a firm‘s compliance (rather 
than engagement) to CSR standards and enables us to test another aspect of CSR to triangulate our 
previous approach. Different from the IVA ratings, the Vigeo ratings are given on a scale of 0-100. The 
results from this alternative CSR sample are shown in Table 5, in which the dependent variables are the 
Environment Score (Panel A), Customers & Suppliers Score (Panel B), and Human Resources Score (Panel C), 
which most represent the interests of a company‘s direct stakeholders. In line with our baseline tests on 
the MSCI IVA sample (Table 2), we use the industry peer average financial policies as our IVs for our 
five financial policies variables.4 As is evident in Table 5, we show similar results. Variables related to 
cash and liquidity mostly have a negative sign, and dividend payout and leverage ratio are positively 
correlated with all three ESG ratings from this alternative sample. Take cash holdings as an example. 
Economically, a one standard deviation increase in cash holdings as a percentage of total assets (8.1%) is 
associated with 4.9% decrease in the Environment Score, 7.1% decrease in the Customers & Suppliers Score, 
and 7.9% decrease in the Human Resources Score.5 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
 
In sum, the CSR agency view predicts a positive and significant correlation between liquidity 
focused agency proxies (e.g., the abundance of cash) and CSR. As long as the coefficients are not 
positive and significant, the agency view is unsubstantiated, which is the case as we find consistent 
significantly negative relations. Our results yield that CSR is adopted by firms characterized by good 
                                                 
4 Again, the coefficients of the five agency indicators in the second stage only are shown for conciseness. Tables 
with more detailed results are available upon request.  
5 In unreported analyses, we also use several country-level shareholder protection law indices as IVs for firm-level 
agency concerns, and similar results are found. These country-level shareholder protection indices include the 
antidirect rights index first developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) and further adjusted by 
Spamann (2010), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI) as in Djankov, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2008), the 
private enforcement of securities law index as in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), the revised one-
share one-vote rule (mandatory proportionality of voting and cash flow) index as in Spamann (2010), and the 
revised mandatory waivable dividend index as in Spamann (2010). 
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governance. Also, in all our models above we control for firm and time fixed effects, which mitigate 
concerns that unobservable firm characteristics or time trends could drive our results.  
 
4.2. Results on pay-for-performance and excess pay 
4.2.1. Pay-for-performance: baseline IV results 
We next investigate how CSR is related to another incentive-based mechanism of corporate 
governance, namely, executive pay-for-performance. The question we try to answer is whether firms 
with stronger pay-for-performance (a proxy for better governance) have higher CSR ratings. To deal 
with the potential endogeneity issue, we again apply an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting 
pay-for-performance with Independent board members, Compensation committee independence, and CEO-chairman 
duality. We report the results from these pay-for-performance analyses in Table 6, showing both the first-
stage and the second-stage results, as well as the Cragg-Donald F-test statistics. In the first stage, the 
dummy variable pay-for-performance [measured by the ASSET4 entry CEO Compensation Link to Total 
Shareholder Return] is regressed on the three above IVs (respectively shown in Columns 1, 3 and 5). In the 
second stage, the dependent variable is the overall IVA rating (Columns 2, 4, and 6) and the key 
explanatory variable is pay-for-performance predicted from the first stage.  
The results on pay-for-performance are again not compatible with the agency view, but instead 
support the good governance view. In the first stage, Independent board members and Compensation committee 
independence are both positively and significantly correlated with pay-for-performance, and CEO-chairman 
duality is negatively and significantly correlated with pay-for-performance. This is consistent with the 
notion that board independence, especially the independence of the compensation committee, induces 
executive pay-for-performance and with the fact that a CEO who is also chairing the board makes 
himself more entrenched and more likely to self-grant unjustified high salaries, which can diminish the 
pay-for-performance relation. The first-stage Cragg-Donald F-test statistics are all above the critical 
value of 16.38, supporting the relevance of these IVs. In the second stage, the coefficients on the pay-
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for-performance variable are positive and significant. The point estimates suggest that the relations are 
economically meaningful. Firms that have an explicit pay-for-performance benchmark on average have 
more than three-grade higher CSR ratings.   
4.2.2. Pay-for-performance with alternative dependent variables and CSR sample 
To verify the robustness of our pay-for-performance results, we use alternative dependent 
variables and an alternative CSR sample, similar to what we have also done for financial policies as 
agency indicators (Subsections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4). The alternative dependent variables are the RiskMetrics 
EcoValue Rating (environmental rating) and Social Rating from the MSCI sample, and the alternative CSR 
sample is the Vigeo ESG data from which we use the Environment Score, the Human Resources Score, and the 
Customers & Suppliers Score (see Table 7). For reasons of conciseness, we show the coefficients of the 
predicted pay-for-performance only in the second stage of 2SLS estimations. We find that firms with 
explicit and clear pay-for-performance benchmarks have on average 1.4 - 2.8 grades higher (on a scale of 
7) on the EcoValue Rating and on the Social Rating or 32 - 40 grades higher (on a scale of 100) on the 
Vigeo ESG ratings, relative to firms without explicit total shareholder return benchmarks. These results 
are consistent with those in Table 6 and provide additional support for the good governance view on 
CSR (and not for the agency view). Firms with better governance mechanisms to incentivizing their top 
executives also engage in and comply more with CSR. 
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
 
4.2.3. Excess pay 
We next use another empirical approach, which consists of estimating Excess pay (the residual 
from a typical CEO compensation regression) that captures the degree to which CEO compensation is 
not explained by firm performance and firm - CEO characteristics in a first stage, and then regress a 
company‘s CSR rating on this predicted excess pay in a second stage. Excess pay can be interpreted as a 
deviation from pay-for-performance and should be positively correlated with CSR in the second stage 
under the agency costs view, but negatively correlated with CSR under the good governance view. 
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We report results of the CSR - excess pay estimation in Table 8, with Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 
reporting the first-stage results of regressing the logarithm of CEO‘s total compensation (in US dollars) 
on different sets of variables capturing firm performance, firm - CEO characteristics, and corporate 
governance. These variables include Tobin‘s q (winsorized at 5%), return on assets (ROA) (winsorized at 
5%), firm size (measured by the logarithm of total assets), CEO duality (a dummy variable capturing 
whether the CEO simultaneously chairs the board), and a self-constructed entrenchment index6, as in 
Column 1. Column 3 includes all the variables of Column 1 but adds a dummy Say-on-pay which 
captures whether the company‘s shareholders have the right to vote on executive compensation. 
Column 5 includes all the variables as in Column 1 and adds the logarithm of board size. Column 7 
includes all the above mentioned variables and also the percentage of independent directors on the 
board (Independent board members), a compensation committee dummy, and blockholder ownership. 7  
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 report the second-stage results of regressing the aggregate IVA rating on the 
predicted residual (Excess pay) from the first stage along with the control variables used in, for example, 
Table 2. Inevitably, lagging independent variables and adding many control variables reduces our sample 
size. Even within the sample for which international data on CEO compensation and characteristics, 
board structures, and other firm variables are available, the patterns are clear. As is evident in Table 8, 
Excess pay is negatively correlated with the aggregate CSR rating. This means that CEOs with high pay 
not related to performance invest less in CSR, which supports the good governance view instead of the 
agency cost perspective. Robustness tests with the IVA environmental and social rations as well as CSR 
ratings from the Vigeo database confirm the relation.8 
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
 
                                                 
6 More detailed description of the entrenchment index can be found in Section 4.5 and in the Appendix. The 
entrenchment index aims at capturing managerial entrenchment as described in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2009) and is the sum of dummies that capture the presence of a poison pill, a golden parachute, a classified board, 
other antitakeover devices, and supermajority requirements for amending the charter and bylaws. 
7 More detailed descriptions of these variables are in the appendix. 
8 Tables with robustness tests are available upon request.  
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4.3. Investor protection laws and CSR 
As the main purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether CSR results from agency problems or are, 
on the contrary, present in well-governed firms, we also turn to the regulatory context of agency and 
governance at the country level. Agency problems can also be shaped by the legal protection of investor 
rights at the country level. In countries with stronger legal protection, agency problems are likely to be 
lower, which can entail that CSR activities are lower if one assumes that they are due to agency problems. 
We therefore explore the relation between country-level investor protection laws and firm-level CSR. 
The relevant country-level investor protection laws are those that provide legal protection of shareholder 
rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). Broadly speaking, the laws that aim at 
addressing agency problems and investor expropriation concern corporate decision making and voting 
(corporate law), information disclosure in securities transactions (securities law), and regulation of related 
parties transactions (anti-self-dealing law), as well as the effectiveness of their enforcement (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). We 
therefore use country-level investor protection laws as a proxy for firm-level agency problems in 
exploring the CSR agency and good governance views. In the agency view, stronger legal protection of 
shareholder rights reduces the incentive and ability of corporate insiders (directors and officers) to 
extract private benefits through CSR-related spending. In contrast, the CSR good governance view 
predicts that CSR spending is positively related to shareholder protection. To test the relations between 
firm-level CSR and country-level shareholder protection laws, we use several country-level investor 
protection indices, which all come from well-established sources. We use the anti-director rights index 
(ADRI) which was first developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and 
revised in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and Spamann (2010).9 We stick to 
the most recent version of ADRI as amended by Spamann (2010). For comparison, we use the anti-self-
dealing index (ASDI) developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), which is 
                                                 
9 Both the original La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) ADRI and the Spamann (2010) revised 
ADRI consist of six key components: (1) proxy by mail allowed, (2) shares not blocked before shareholder 
meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation, (4) oppressed minority protection, (5) preemptive 
rights to new share issues, and (6) percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. 
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not directly related to corporate decision making but more related to the regulation on insider 
expropriation, and contains ex ante control of self-dealing and ex post control of self-dealing variables. 
We include the variable public enforcement of anti-self-dealing index also developed by Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
We regress CSR ratings on various shareholder protection laws variables (Table 9) and show that 
company law on shareholder protection (ADRI) is strongly and positively correlated with CSR.10 The 
positive correlations between corporate law and CSR suggest that when legal rules are stronger in 
disciplining corporate behavior toward good conduct to investors, especially to minority shareholders, 
firms are more likely to engage in social responsibilities. The effects are also economically meaningful. 
For example, a one standard deviation in ADRI is associated with 0.35 (0.297 x 1.184) increases in the 
overall IVA rating, or a more than 12% (0.35 / 2.85) increase from the mean IVA. In Panel B, in which 
the dependent variables are the Vigeo ESG ratings that focus more on CSR compliance (instead of on 
the CSR practice or engagement of Panel A), company law on shareholder protection (ADRI) still plays 
a positive role. However, we do not find consistent results for the anti-self-dealing index and the public 
enforcement of self-dealing in Panels A and B. The insignificance of the latter two indices can be 
explained by the fact that, as CSR represents a shareholder-stakeholder trade-off, the most relevant 
regulation is the one related to corporate decision making and voting. In contrast, ASDI and the public 
enforcement index mostly capture a constraint on insider trading transactions and are not directly related 
to how companies make decisions regarding stakeholders‘ welfare. 
[Insert Table 9 about Here] 
 
4.4. Large shareholders and CSR 
                                                 
10 To save space, we do not report the parameter estimates of the control variables: cash holdings (scaled by total 
assets), leverage ratio, return on assets (ROA), Tobin‘s q, interest coverage, current ratio, ownership dispersion 
(the Bureau van Dijck‘s independence indicator), as well as industry and time fixed effects. Full tables are available 
upon request. As a robustness test, we set up specifications that include the original ADRI from La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and the revised ADRI from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008), and find similar results. 
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Besides firm-level liquidity (Subsection 4.1), pay-for-performance (Subsection 4.2), and country-
level shareholder protection laws (Subsection 4.3), another important governance mechanism affecting 
agency issues is the firm‘s ownership structure; in particular, the degree to which control is concentrated 
in the hands of large shareholders and whether large shareholders can use excessive voting power to 
entrench themselves (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 
2002). Therefore, we further evaluate the agency versus good governance views on CSR from the 
perspective of ownership and control. In countries other than the US, the UK, and Australia, large firms 
typically have shareholders that own a significant proportion of the equity (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and 
Lang, 2002). Ownership patterns are rather stable in general, especially outside the US, and are largely 
shaped by the companies‘ histories and their founding or controlling families (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002). Therefore, large shareholders‘ ownership concentration could be 
considered as relatively exogenous to CSR decisions of a firm, and our empirical analyses on the effects 
of large shareholders are conducted in a setting without IVs. 
The relation between the level of concentrated ownership and firm-level agency problems is 
theoretically unclear. On the one hand, ownership in the hands of one or a few large shareholders could 
create agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). 
The concern is diversion of firm value from the minority to the controlling shareholder. The possibility 
of this expropriation, and hence this type of large shareholder agency problem, can be augmented when 
the firm‘s free cash flow increases and leverage and dividend payouts decrease (as there is now more to 
divert). On the other hand, the controlling shareholders can effectively steer managerial decision making 
and, hence, also function as a mechanism to curb the managerial agency problem (which Subsections 
4.1–4.3 were mainly about). Either way, large shareholders‘ ownership and control can shape the degree 
to which agency problems are present within the firm and can also be used as a proxy for firm-level 
agency problems. However, the two mechanisms mentioned above—one capturing the major 
shareholder‘s incentive to monitor the manager to maximize firm value (incentive effect) and the other 
capturing the large shareholder‘s expropriation of the rights of minority shareholders (expropriation 
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effect)—lead to opposite predictions on the relation between large shareholder ownership and CSR, 
which creates an empirical challenge to directly test such relation. One way to circumvent this problem is 
to disentangle the incentive and expropriation effects of large shareholders‘ ownership, which can be 
achieved through separating control rights from cash flow rights. Controlling shareholders can establish 
control over firms with only minimal cash flow rights (ownership) when a deviation from the one share, 
one vote rule applies (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 
2000; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Lins, 2003). This wedge between 
large shareholder voting and cash flow rights can single out the expropriation effects of large 
shareholders and can help capture the large shareholder agency problem. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and 
Lang (2002) separate the largest shareholder‘s voting rights and cash flow rights and find that firm value 
increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive 
effect, but that firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow 
ownership, consistent with an expropriation effect.  
We therefore test the relation between the largest shareholder‘s voting rights in excess of its cash 
flow rights (wedge) and CSR using the ASSET4 sample, which is composed of standardized data on the 
largest shareholder‘s voting and cash flow rights for a sample of companies around the world.11 Our 
model specifications follow those of Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) in that we also capture the non-monotonic 
effects of large shareholders‘ cash flow rights by including both the Largest shareholder’s ownership and its 
square. We also control for country, industry, and year fixed effects (the above studies controlled only 
for industry). Our main explanatory variables are Wedge1, which is the difference between the largest 
shareholder‘s voting and cash flow rights, and Wedge2, which is the ratio of voting rights and cash flow 
                                                 
11 The reason that we resort to the ASSET4 sample is that its CSR ratings can be directly matched to the data on 
largest shareholders‘ voting rights and cash flow rights, and we can preserve the numbers of observations to the 
largest extent compared with using other CSR samples. Nevertheless, when we conduct the same analysis with the 
MSCI IVA sample and the Vigeo sample (but with smaller numbers of observations due to more missing data on 
largest shareholders‘ ownership and control), similar results are obtained. Tables with alternative CSR sample tests 
are available upon request. 
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rights. To control for doing good by doing well, we include the equity market-to-book ratio and add the 
standard control variables [used by Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009)]. In the agency view of CSR, the controlling shareholders can use their majority voting 
rights to expropriate minority shareholders by approving CSR projects that benefit only themselves. 
Therefore, a positive association between CSR and the control wedge is expected under the agency view. 
The results from our general least squares (GLS) regressions are shown in Table 10. Some 
interesting observations can be made. First, throughout all specifications, the coefficients on both 
Wedge1 and Wedge2 are negative and significant. This negative sign does not support the agency view that 
considers CSR spending as a corollary of controlling shareholders‘ entrenchment and possible 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Second, the effect of the largest shareholder‘s ownership seems 
to be non-monotonic on different aspects of CSR, as the coefficients of largest shareholder‘s ownership 
are all negative and significant, while that of the square of ownership are all positive. This is consistent 
with the previous literature in that both incentive and entrenchment mechanisms of controlling 
shareholders affect corporate outcomes. The simplified specifications (controlling only for performance) 
and the more complex ones (also including other traditional financial controls) yield both qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar results, although the sample size for the latter shrinks. These results also hold 
for various ESG sub-indices that we do not report for reasons of conciseness. In terms of control 
variables, the positive coefficients on the equity market-to-book mostly support the doing good by doing 
well conjecture. Firm size and year since incorporation also have positive loadings on CSR, indicating 
that larger and more established companies are more likely to engage in CSR. Overall, the direct effects 
of controlling shareholder ownership and control (the wedge between voting and cash flow rights) imply 
that CSR is not likely to be used as a self-serving tool for controlling shareholders to extract private 
benefits, shirk, or build empires, though large shareholders do not seem to overspend on CSR (due to 
the internalization of its costs). This reflects that a CSR policy is expensive but does not by itself provide 
support for the agency view.  
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[Insert Table 10 about Here] 
 
4.5. CSR, agency problems, and shareholder value 
As a final extension, we consider the relations between CSR, agency problems, and shareholder 
value together in a cross-country setting, which has not been explored in the literature. If CSR is not 
incompatible with good governance, this should have value implications. We therefore further explore 
the role of CSR in facilitating value enhancement and also test whether CSR counterbalances the 
negative effects of agency problems and poor corporate governance on firm value. To do so, we use the 
ASSET4 sample and utilize data on several governance provisions under its corporate governance pillar 
to construct a global entrenchment index (global E-index) as a proxy for poor governance. Our global 
E-index follows the structure of the original US E-index by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell. (2009). We 
have tried our best to mimic accurately the original E-index by applying the same governance provisions 
across countries. Only slight differences relative to the original US index occur due to data availability in 
Datastream. The provisions in our global E-index include the presence of a poison pill, a golden 
parachute, a classified board, other antitakeover devices, and supermajority requirements for amending 
the charter and bylaws. We term this E-index as Entrenchment Index 1. We also create Entrenchment Index 2 
by replacing the classified board in Entrenchment Index 1 by a staggered board. 12  
We conduct our test on a panel data set of more than 47 hundred largest public firms from 60 
countries in the ASSET4 sample from 2002 to 2013. Again, the main reason for using the ASSET4 
sample is that its CSR ratings can be directly matched to the data on the E-index, and we can thus 
preserve the number of observations to the largest extent (compared with using other CSR samples). 
The dependent variable for all specifications is Tobin‘s q, defined as the ratio of market value of equity 
to the book value of equity, winsorized at the 5% level. The key explanatory variables are the global E-
index, the CSR rating (measured by ASSET4‘s overall CSR score, environmental score, and social score), 
                                                 
12 A classified board is a general term that refers to the situation in which the terms of board directors can be 
different from each other (and end in different years), while a staggered board refers to the situation in which the 
terms of board directors are uniform (but end in different years).  
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and the interaction term between the E-index and CSR. If CSR is induced by good governance (at least 
those governance mechanisms related to the efficient use of cash, the disbursement of earnings to 
shareholders, and pay-for-performance), this can counterbalance the negative impact of managerial 
agency problems otherwise induced by entrenchment (as proxied by the E-index). We use standard 
financial controls, such as firm size [measured as Log(Assets)], the largest shareholder‘s cash flow rights 
and its square, return on equity (ROE), leverage ratio, capital expenditure, and dividends per share, as 
well as year, country, and industry fixed effects.  
The coefficients on the two measures of our global E-index are mostly negatively related to Tobin‘s 
q which signifies that entrenchment reduces value (Table 11). This finding is consistent with the US 
results based on the original E-index as in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). The effects of CSR on a 
non-entrenched firm (the noninteracted CSR rating) are positively related to firm value for the overall 
and social CSR ratings or insignificantly so for the environmental ratings specifications. We also show 
that CSR affects firms with strong entrenchment. The interaction term between CSR and the global E-
index is positive and significant for almost all CSR ratings (the environmental, social, and overall indices). 
This reinforces our earlier findings supporting the good governance view and suggests that CSR and the 
firm governance that induces CSR, instead of being an agency problem, attenuates the negative effects of 
some types of agency problems (e.g., those related to managerial entrenchment as proxied by the E-
index) on firm value. Potential endogeneity issues could still exist, and unfortunately no single 
instrumental variable is readily available for the interaction that captures all aspects of CSR as well as of 
entrenchment. Moreover, the entrenchment index is directly relevant for companies with dispersed 
ownership, not those with controllers. Therefore, the interaction results should be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, corporate charters and bylaws as well as the use of the other antitakeover 
provisions are very stable over time (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), which could partly eliminate 
endogeneity concerns.  
[Insert Table 11 about Here] 
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5. Conclusions 
In most Anglo-American countries, consensus exists that corporate governance is about ―how 
investors get the managers to give them back their money‖ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.738). Corporate 
social responsibility, because of its focus on stakeholders in addition to shareholders, is often considered 
as a form of cash diversion and an agency problem. In contrast to this agency perspective on CSR stands 
the good governance view, which states that CSR activities are often adopted by firms characterized by 
good governance. In this debate, legal rules and ownership structures are very different outside the 
Anglo-American world, which significantly influences the executives‘ incentives, the fiduciary duties of 
the management and the board of directors, and the decision-making process. The debate on the role of 
corporate social responsibility therefore often reflects the varieties of capitalism across countries and the 
boundaries of the firm. 
In this paper, we utilize public and proprietary data on corporate compliance and engagement in 
stakeholder issues to comprehensively assess the agency and good governance views of CSR. Our 
empirical set-up is well grounded in fundamental economic theory: incentives, information asymmetry, 
and control. We do not find empirical evidence that CSR is associated with ex ante agency concerns, 
such as abundance of cash (as proxied by cash holdings, free cash flow, capital expenditures, dividend 
payout, and leverage), or a weak connection between managerial pay and corporate performance (as 
proxied by a total shareholder return benchmark and excess CEO pay). Instead, higher CSR 
performance is closely related to tighter cash constraints—usually a proxy for better disciplined 
managerial practice in the traditional corporate finance literature (Jensen, 1986)— and higher pay-for-
performance sensitivity. In addition, CSR is positively related to legal protection of shareholder rights 
and negatively related to controlling shareholders‘ expropriation of minority shareholders. Whereas the 
vast majority of the literature has emphasized the agency costs of managerial entrenchment and large 
shareholders‘ control, as well as their economic consequences such as distorting resource allocation and 
impeding economic growth, our empirical findings show that these costs are at least not incurred 
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through CSR activities. Moreover, we find evidence that a positive correlation exists between CSR and 
Tobin‘s q in firms with few agency problems and that CSR and the firm governance that induces CSR 
counterbalances the negative association between firm value (proxied by Tobin‘s q) and managerial 
entrenchment (captured by the global entrenchment index). Our empirical results (based on an 
instrumental variables estimation) suggest that good governance causes high CSR and that a firm‘s CSR 
practice is not inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization, which induces a positive stance on 
CSR, also found in Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015), and Deng, Kang, and Low (2013).  
None of this is to say that more CSR is always better. Undertaking some CSR activities can be 
driven by managerial utility considerations, such as the satisfaction of some personal or moral imperative 
of the manager, instead of the enhancement of shareholder wealth (Moser and Martin, 2012). Moreover, 
shareholders always internalize the costs of CSR expenditures, and as their ownership stakes increase, 
they can reduce spending on CSR. Our main argument is that, in general, corporate social responsibility 
need not to be inevitably induced by agency problems but can be consistent with a core value of 
capitalism, generating more returns to investors, through enhancing firm value and shareholder wealth.  
Taking the evidence in this paper at face value, several policy implications emerge for the 
improvement of corporate governance, particularly in the area of corporate social responsibility. 
Undoubtedly, governments have a responsibility for dealing with market failures and externalities, but 
government might not always be incentivized and effective in achieving this goal. Governments can be 
corrupt, inefficient, and even predatory towards the private sector (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), in which 
case they fail to provide public goods. Therefore, corporate social responsibility in the private sector—
the private provision of public goods (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012)—can be important for 
preserving social welfare. While many researchers believe that such private provision of public goods can 
be associated with agency problems that divert shareholder wealth and even undermine the foundations 
of capitalism, we cast doubt on such belief. Corporate governance reforms should take into account 
such positive externalities.  
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Appendix  
Variables Description 
Anti-director 
rights index 
(ADRI) 
First developed in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) as a measure of investor 
protection against corporate management and later on revised in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008) and Spamann (2010). All the three ADRIs consist of the same six key components: (1) 
proxy by mail allowed, (2) shares not blocked before shareholder meeting, (3) cumulative voting and 
proportional representation, (4) oppressed minority protection, (5) preemptive rights to new share issues, 
(6) percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting. Each component is a dummy 
variable, and the ADRI is formed by aggregating the value of all six components. The index ranges from 0 
to 6, whereby a higher value of the index indicates stronger shareholder protection. Source: La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); La Porta et al. (2008); Spamann (2010). 
Anti-self-dealing 
index (ASDI) 
Developed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and is an average of ex ante and 
ex post private control of self-dealing. The ex ante private control of self-dealing transactions includes 
approval by disinterested shareholders and ex ante disclosure by the buyer, the insider, and independent 
review. The ex post private control of self-dealing transactions include the disclosure in periodic filings 
and the ease of proving wrongdoing (holding the insider and the approving body civilly liable and having 
access to evidence). Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
Public 
enforcement of 
anti-self-dealing 
Index of public enforcement if all disclosure and approval requirements have been met. Ranges from 0 to 
1. One-quarter point when each of the following sanctions is available: (1) fines for the approving body, 
(2) jail sentences for approving body, (3) fines for the insider, and (4) jail sentences for the insider. Source: 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). 
GDP per capita GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current US dollars. 
Source: World Bank. 
Cash holding Amount of cash and cash equivalent on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Free cash flows Computed as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) multiplied by (1 – tax rate), plus Depreciation & 
Amortization, minus Change in Working Capital, and minus Capital Expenditure, finally scaled by total 
assets. Source: Compustat. 
Capital 
expenditure 
Capital expenditure recorded on the balance sheet, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Dividend payout 
ratio 
Calculated as the common dividends divided by net income, as recorded on the company‘s financial 
statement. Source: Datastream. 
Leverage  Calculated as the book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total equity of the company (MSCI 
and Vigeo samples) or the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets of the 
company (ASSET4 sample). Source: Compustat. 
Pay for 
performance 
Dummy variable that equals one if the executive compensation is linked to total shareholder value (TSR) 
and is measured using Thomson Reuter‘s ASSET4 data category ―CEO Compensation Link to TSR‖. This 
variable is based on a textual analysis from companies‘ annual reports and media reports. Source: ASSET4 
(Thomson Reuters) and BoardEx. 
Excess pay Residual of regressing the chief executive officer (CEO) total compensation on the one-year lagged 
Tobin‘s a, firm size, CEO characteristics variables, CEO incentives variables, and corporate governance 
variables, as well as firm and time fixed effects. Source on total compensation: ASSET4 (Thomson 
Reuters) and BoardEx. 
Percent of 
Independent 
board members 
Percentage of independent board members as reported by the company. Independent board members are 
directors who are not employed by the company, have not served on the board for more than ten years, 
are not or do not represent a reference shareholder with more than 5% of holding, do not hold cross-
board memberships, do not have recent, immediate family ties to the company and do not accept any 
compensation other than compensation for board service. Source: ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters) and 
BoardEx. 
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Compensation 
committee 
independence 
Percentage of independent compensation committee members as stipulated by the company. Source: 
ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters) and BoardEx. 
CEO-chairman 
duality 
Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO simultaneously chairs the board and zero otherwise. Source: 
ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters) and BoardEx. 
Say-on-pay Dummy variable that equals one if the company‘s shareholders have the right to vote on executive 
compensation and zero otherwise. Source: ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters) and BoardEx. 
Board size Total number of board members at the end of the fiscal year. Source: ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters) and 
BoardEx. 
Compensation 
committee 
Dummy variable that equals one if the company has a compensation committee on the board and zero 
otherwise. Source: ASSET4 (Thomson Reuters) and BoardEx. 
Blockholder 
ownership 
Total ownership of all blockholders who hold at least 5% of the company‘s shares. Source: Orbis. 
Wedge Ratio of the voting rights to the ownership for the largest shareholder of the company. Wedge1 stands for 
the difference between the voting rights and the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. Wedge2 stands 
for the ratio of the voting rights to the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder. Source: Datastream. 
ROA Return on assets, net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Tobin‘s q Ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity of the company. Source: Compustat. 
Financial 
constraints 
Measured by the ratio of the change in short-term investment to the change in operational cash flow. 
Source: Compustat. 
Interest coverage EBIT divided by interest expenses. Source: Compustat. 
Financial slack Current debts divided by current assets. Source: Compustat. 
CapEx to sales 
ratio 
Ratio of capital expenditure to the total sales revenue, a measure following Berger and Ofek (1995). 
Source: Compustat. 
Firm size Book value of total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat. 
Firm age Number of years since the firm‘s year of incorporation. Source: Datastream. 
Dividend per 
share 
Rolling 12-month dividend per share (adjusted). This variable intends to represent the anticipated payment 
over the following 12 months and for that reason is calculated on a rolling 12-month basis or is the 
indicated or forecasted annual amount. Special or once-off dividends are generally excluded. Dividends 
per share are displayed gross, inclusive of local tax credits when applicable, except for Belgium, France, 
Ireland, and the UK, where dividends per share are displayed on a net basis. Source: Datastream. 
ROE Return on equity; net income divided by total assets. Source: Compustat. 
Annual sales 
growth rate 
Annual growth rate of sales revenue of the firm. Source: Datastream. 
Largest 
shareholder‘s 
ownership 
Percentage ownership of the single largest owner (by voting power). Source: Datastream (ASSET4). 
Sustainable 
country rating 
Country-level sovereign ESG scores and benchmarks based on 120 ESG risk and performance indicators 
in three domains: (1) environmental protection, (2) social protection and solidarity,  and (3) rule of law and 
governance. Countries are graded on a scale of one hundred on their commitment and performance in 
these indicators (e.g., ratification of the Kyoto convention, the Vienna convention, the Stockholm 
convention, CO2 emissions per head, Gini index, etc.). Source: Vigeo. 
Entrenchment 
Index 1 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), the 
Entrenchment Index 1 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the period 
2002-2013 and is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream‘s ASSET4 sample based on the 
presence of a poison pill, a golden parachute, a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and 
charter, a classified board, and other anti-takeover provisions. Missing values are treated as zeros. Source: 
Datastream. 
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Entrenchment 
Index 2 
Following the original Entrenchment Index with US coverage by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), the 
Entrenchment Index 2 is constructed for firms from 64 countries across the world during the period 
2002-2013, and is the sum of the five dummy variables from Datastream‘s ASSET4 sample based on the 
presence of a poison pill, a golden parachute, a supermajority requirement for amending bylaw and 
charter, a staggered board (the terms of board members are uniform), and other antitakeover provisions. 
Missing values are treated as zeros. Source: Datastream. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Panel A. MSCI Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) sample and Vigeo environmental, social, and governance (ESG) sample 
Variable 
MSCI IVA sample Vigeo ESG sample 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Overall IVA score 47,775 2.850 3 1.753 0 6       
EcoValue score 90,496 2.926 3 1.833 0 6       
Social score 61,119 2.857 3 1.725 0 6       
Vigeo Environment score       7,048 33.867 34.000 18.534 0 87 
Vigeo Human Resources score       7,048 32.378 31.000 17.939 0 84 
Vigeo Customers & Suppliers 
score 
      7,048 40.981 42.000 13.473 4 82 
Cash holdings (scaled by 
assets) 
77,061 0.075 0.045 0.086 0 0.994 5,995 0.076 0.051 0.081 0 0.787 
Free cash flows (scaled by 
assets) 
65,728 0.060 0.057 0.049 -0.034 0.159 4,804 0.104 0.094 0.055 0.020 0.227 
Capital expenditure (scaled by 
assets) 
67,091 0.052 0.042 0.046 0 1.037 4,984 0.049 0.040 0.043 0 0.498 
Dividend payout (dividend-
sales ratio) (percent) 
56,116 2.912 1.856 3.068 0 11.386 4,649 4.256 2.855 4.282 0 16.246 
Leverage ratio (winsorized) 78,004 0.615 0.613 0.208 0.228 0.955 6,038 0.646 0.094 0.194 0.288 0.961 
ROA (winsorized) 74,993 0.049 0.043 0.038 -0.001 0.149 5,876 0.047 0.040 0.038 0.012 0.117 
Tobin’s q (winsorized) 82,269 1.730 1.427 0.825 0.970 3.977 6,766 2.751 1.935 2.911 0.620 8.020 
Financial constraints 
(winsorized) 
62,076 0.264 0.006 0.495 0 1.832 4,738 0.296 0.035 0.500 0 1.784 
Interest coverage (winsorized) 73,948 11.988 5.975 13.807 1.115 45.310 5,821 9.799 5.388 10.317 1.118 33.80 
Financial slack (current ratio) 63,342 1.721 1.365 1.572 0.038 184.984 4,852 0.850 0.774 0.472 0 6.527 
Blockholder ownership 54,746 35.57% 23.12% 33.92% 0% 100% 6,755 35.31% 23.56% 34.27% 0% 100% 
Largest shareholder’s ownership 25,558 21.22% 13.21% 18.56% 0% 100% 4,787 18.79% 11.05% 17.38% 0.06% 100% 
Board size 55,990 11.518 11 4.165 1 45 5,513 11.942 11 4.031 2 44 
Independence of board members 47,701 59.15% 41.67% 30.09% 0% 100% 4,702 60.56% 50% 27.50% 0% 100% 
Compensation committee 56,482 0.835 1 0.371 0 1 5,533 0.890 1 0.313 0 1 
Compensation committee 
independence 
45,165 86.42% 100% 27.51% 0% 100% 4,691 81.11% 100% 30.17% 0% 100% 
Say on pay 56,558 0.210 0 0.407 0 1 5,533 0.278 0 0.473 0 1 
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CEO-chairman duality 56,431 0.369 0 0.483 0 1 5,533 0.278 0 0.448 0 1 
CEO compensation link to TSR 56,482 0.361 0 0.480 0 1 5,533 0.417 0 0.493 0 1 
Adjusted anti-director rights 
index 
89,765 3.371 4 1.184 2 5 7,006 3.757 4 1.098 2 5 
Anti-self-dealing index 89,947 0.617 0.650 0.212 0.170 1 7,047 0.546 0.500 0.240 0.2 1 
Public enforcement of anti-self-
dealing 
89,947 0.197 0 0.339 0 1 7,047 0.331 0 0.403 0 1 
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Table 1 (Cont). Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. ASSET4 Sample 
Variable Number of 
Observations 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Wedge1 (voting minus cash flow rights) 20,573 1.165% 0 7.245% -89.84% 99.99% 
Wedge2 (voting over cash flow rights) 20,562 4.039 1 170.790 0 10000 
Largest shareholder’s ownership 23,797 22.029% 13.6% 19.578% 0 100% 
Largest shareholder’s voting rights 20,716 23.590% 14.3% 20.881% 0 100% 
Equity book-to-market (winsorized) 46,583 2.359 1.800 1.757 0.500 7.280 
Firm size (Total assets) 31,133 3612965 6123 2.15×108 0 3.06×1010 
Firm age 23,374 34.740 23 31.655 0 185 
Annual sales growth rate (winsorized) 46,799 12.627% 8.16% 21,157% -19.070% 69.830% 
CapEx to sales ratio (winsorized) 29,015 0.017 0.001 0.044 2.54×10-6 0.185 
Leverage ratio (winsorized) 31,061 21.081% 15.932% 382.758% -0.034% 67392% 
Dividend per share (winsorized) 47,541 4.014 0.345 9.940 0 41 
ROE (winsorized) 31,082 0.121 0.118 0.143 -0.209 0.427 
ROA (winsorized) 31,084 0.051 0.045 0.060 -0.073 0.179 
Entrenchment Index 1 53,472 0.690 0 1.037 0 5 
Entrenchment Index 2 53,472 0.889 0 1.239 0 5 
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Table 2. Corporate social responsibility and agency indicators with firm-level instrumental variables (IVs): two-stage least-square (2SLS) estimations with industry-peer 
average financial policies as IVs 
     The table shows the results from 2SLS estimations using an instrumental variable approach. The dependent variables (DVs) in the first stage (columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9), 
are cash holdings (scaled by total assets), free cash flows (FCF, scaled by total assets), capital expenditure (CapEx, scaled by total assets), dividend payout (dividend/sales ratio), and 
leverage (debt-to-asset ratio), respectively. These five agency proxies are then instrumented by the corresponding within-sample firm-level industry peers‘ financial policies in 
the second stage, calculated as the arithmetic means of each of the five financial policies variables for a firm‘s industry peers (the industry classification is based on 
Worldscope) by year and across countries. The dependent variables in the second stage (Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10), are the (IVA) rating from MSCI‘s Intangible Value 
Assessment database. All independent variables are lagged by one year. The Cragg-Donald F-test statistics (the weak instruments‘ test) and the P-values are reported for the 
first stage. All regressions control for firm and time fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  Stock-Yogo weak identification value: 10% maximal IV size—16.38; 15% maximal IV size—8.96; 20% 
maximal IV size—6.66; 25% maximal IV size 5.53. 
 
  
 
 
 Cash FCF CapEx Dividend ratio Leverage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
First 
stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
Agency indicator DV=cash DV=CSR DV=FCF DV=CSR DV=CapEx DV=CSR 
 
DV=dividend 
DV=CSR DV=leverage DV=CSR 
           
Cash (scaled by assets)  -0.0127***         
  (0.0037)         
Industry peer cash (IV) 0.749***          
 (0.010)          
FCF (scaled by assets)    -0.0131**       
    (0.0055)       
Industry peer FCF (IV)   0.657***        
   (0.022)        
CapEx (scaled by assets)      -0.0345***     
      (0.007)     
Industry peer CapEx (IV)     0.819***      
     (0.024)      
Dividend/sales ratio        0.0035***   
        (0.0012)   
Industry peer dividend       0.090***    
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(IV) 
       (0.011)    
Leverage ratio          0.0555*** 
          (0.007) 
Industry peer leverage (IV)         0.254***  
         (0.015)  
 
      
           
           
Control variable           
           
Ln(Assets) -2.215*** 0.415*** 1.416*** 0.510*** -0.278 0.444*** -1.144 0.536*** 2.182*** 0.371*** 
 (0.220) (0.0573) (0.364) (0.0594) (0.232) (0.0570) (7.538) (0.0713) (0.561) (0.0668) 
Largest shareholder’s ownership -0.018*** 0.0043*** -0.042*** 0.00316** -0.028*** 0.00367** -0.177 0.0140*** 0.005 0.00435** 
 (0.006) (0.00155) (0.010) (0.00157) (0.006) (0.00155) (0.205) (0.00196) (0.015) (0.00174) 
Tobin’s q -0.055 0.0356 -0.491* 0.0699 -1.122*** 0.0235 -2.610 0.0484 -0.258 0.121** 
 (0.171) (0.0447) (0.276) (0.0447) (0.182) (0.0456) (6.231) (0.0591) (0.427) (0.0504) 
ROA -0.0013 0.00251 -0.032 0.00175 -0.010 0.00264 -0.715 -0.00278 0.404*** -0.0192*** 
 (0.015) (0.00403) (0.024) (0.00398) (0.016) (0.00398) (0.542) (0.00520) (0.039) (0.00528) 
Interest coverage 0.011*** 0.000305 0.041*** 0.000767 0.033*** 0.00129 0.138 0.00201** -0.094*** 0.00559*** 
 (0.003) (0.000799) (0.005) (0.000844) (0.003) (0.000847) (0.104) (0.00100) (0.008) (0.00115) 
Current ratio 0.424*** 0.00586 0.037 0.0359** 0.146** 0.0337* 6.952*** -0.0292** -0.367*** 0.0259** 
 (0.041) (0.0109) (0.112) (0.0181) (0.073) (0.0180) (1.284) (0.0143) (0.101) (0.0123) 
Ln(GDP per capita) -2.758*** 0.838*** 4.966*** 0.957*** 1.200 0.918*** -16.210 0.131 7.084*** 0.334 
 (0.947) (0.247) (1.619) (0.262) (1.069) (0.262) (31.762) (0.300) (2.400) (0.290) 
Globalization -0.142*** 0.0866*** 0.045 0.0868*** -0.055 0.0870*** -1.822 0.0505*** 0.224** 0.0655*** 
 (0.044) (0.0115) (0.072) (0.0117) (0.048) (0.0117) (1.442) (0.0137) (0.112) (0.0133) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  8,624  8,458  8,468  6,537  8,431 
R-squared  0.8633  0.8650  0.8653  0.8662  0.8492 
First stage Cragg-Donald F-test 
statistics 
4985.916 (P = 0.00) 857.34 (P = 0.00) 1175.45 (P = 0.00) 66.18 (P = 0.00) 281.46 (P = 0.00) 
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Table 3. CSR and agency indicators with firm-level instrumental variables (IVs): two-stage least-
square (2SLS) estimations with poison pill and classified board as the IV  
     The table shows the results from 2SLS estimations using an IV approach. Only the second–stage 
results are shown for conciseness (the setup is similar to Table 2). The dependent variables in the 
first stages are cash holdings (scaled by total assets), free cash flows (FCF, scaled by total assets), capital 
expenditure (CapEx, scaled by total assets), dividend payout (dividend/sales ratio), and leverage (debt-to-
asset ratio). These five agency proxies are then instrumented by the ordinal variable poison pill in 
combination with classified board that takes the value zero if the firm neither adopted a poison pill 
nor has a classified board, one if the firm adopted either of the two, and two if the firm has both. 
The dependent variables in the second stage (columns 1-5) are the IVA ratings from MSCI‘s 
Intangible Value Assessment database. All independent variables are lagged by one year. All 
regressions include the control variables reported in Table 2 and control for firm and time fixed 
effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cash (scaled by assets) -0.0749*     
 (0.0454)     
FCF (scaled by assets)  -0.132    
  (0.234)    
CapEx(scaled by assets)   -0.247***   
   (0.0825)   
Dividend payout    0.886**  
    (0.425)  
Leverage     0.151* 
     (0.0871) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,544 8,790 8,959 7,371 8,873 
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Table 4. Corporate social responsibility and agency indicators: robustness with alternative dependent 
variables 
     The table shows the results from 2SLS estimations using an instrumental variable approach. Only the 
second stage results are shown for conciseness (the setup is similar to Table 2). The dependent variables 
in the first stage are cash holdings (scaled by total assets), free cash flows (FCF, scaled by total assets), capital 
expenditure (CapEx, scaled by total assets), dividend payout (dividend/sales ratio), and leverage (debt-to-asset 
ratio). These five agency proxies are then instrumented by the corresponding within-sample firm-level 
industry peers‘ financial policies and are calculated as the arithmetic means of each of the five financial 
policies variables for a firm‘s industry peers (the industry classification is based on Worldscope) by year 
and across countries. The dependent variable in the second stage is the EcoValue rating (environmental 
rating) as in Panel A and is the Riskmetrics Social rating as in Panel B. All independent variables are one-year 
lagged. All regressions include the control variables reported in Table 2 and control for firm- and time-
fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable is EcoValue Rating (environmental rating) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cash (scaled by assets) 0.0297     
 (0.0219)     
FCF (scaled by assets)  -0.0244***    
  (0.0045)    
CapEx (scaled by assets)   -0.0290***   
   (0.0071)   
Dividend / sales ratio    0.00013***  
    (0.00003)  
Leverage ratio     0.00197 
     (0.00167) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 10,530 10,513 10,716 7,819 10,727 
Panel B. Dependent variable is RiskMetrics Social Rating 
Cash (scaled by assets) -0.0115***     
 (0.00345)     
FCF (scaled by assets)  -0.0320***    
  (0.00506)    
CapEx (scaled by assets)   -0.0202***   
   (0.00745)   
Dividend / sales ratio    0.0115  
    (0.0218)  
Leverage ratio     0.0203*** 
     (0.00510) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,961 9,776 9,786 7,332 9,715 
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Table 5. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and agency indicators: robustness with alternative 
CSR sample 
     The table shows the results from the two–stage least squares (2SLS) estimations using an 
instrumental variable approach. Only the second–stage results for the main explanatory variables are 
shown for conciseness. The dependent variables in the first stage are cash holdings (scaled by total 
assets), free cash flows (FCF, scaled by total assets), capital expenditure (CapEx, scaled by total assets), 
dividend payout (dividend/sales ratio), and leverage (debt-to-asset ratio). These five agency proxies are 
then instrumented by the corresponding within-sample firm-level industry peers‘ average financial 
policies (country-industry-year average) and are the arithmetic means of each of the five financial 
policies variables for a firm‘s industry peers (the industry classification is based on Worldscope) by 
year and across countries. The dependent variables in the second stage are the Environmental Score 
(Panel A), Customers & Suppliers Score (Panel B), and Human Resources Score (Panel C), all are from 
Vigeo‘s environmental, social, and governance database. The control variables are the same as those 
reported in Table 2. The regressions include firm and time fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable is Vigeo Environment Score 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cash (scaled by assets) -0.604*     
 (0.344)     
FCF (scaled by assets)  -0.198    
  (0.267)    
CapEx (scaled by assets)   -0.455   
   (0.400)   
Dividend/sales ratio    1.270**  
    (0.549)  
Leverage ratio     1.335*** 
     (0.333) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and firm fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Dependent variable is Vigeo Customers & Suppliers Score 
Cash (scaled by assets) -0.939*     
 (0.507)     
FCF (scaled by assets)  -6.083    
  (14.03)    
CapEx (scaled by assets)   0.176   
   (0.350)   
Dividend / sales ratio    1.655***  
    (0.460)  
Leverage ratio     1.035* 
     (0.541) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and firm fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C. Dependent variable is Vigeo Human Resources Score 
Cash (scaled by assets) -1.035**     
 (0.523)     
FCF (scaled by assets)  -0.314    
  (0.263)    
CapEx (scaled by assets)   -0.436   
   (0.396)   
Dividend / sales ratio    1.056*  
    (0.560)  
Leverage ratio     0.460* 
     (0.257) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and firm fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,414 3,383 3,487 3,295 3,434 
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Table 6. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive pay-for-performance: two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations  
     The table shows the results of CSR and executive pay-for-performance from 2SLS estimations using the instrumental variable (IV) approach. The dependent 
variable (DV) in the first stage is a dummy variable pay-for-performance, which indicates whether executive pay is linked to total shareholder return (TSR) and is 
measured using Thomson Reuter‘s ASSET4 data category ―CEO Compensation Link to TSR‖. This variable is based on a textual analysis from companies‘ 
annual reports. The IVs for pay-for-performance are the percentage of independent board members as reported by the company (percent independent board members, 
as in Columns 1-2), the percentage of independent compensation committee members as stipulated by the company (Compensation committee independence, as in 
Columns 3-4), and a dummy variable indicating whether the chief executive officer (CEO) simultaneously chairs the board (CEO-chairman duality, as in Columns 5-
6). The dependent variable in the second stage is the IVA rating from MSCI‘s Intangible Value Assessment database. All independent variables are one-year 
lagged. The Cragg-Donald F-test statistics (weak instrument test) are reported for the first stage. All regressions control for firm- and time-fixed effect. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values: 10% maximal IV size—16.38; 15% maximal IV size—8.96; 20% maximal IV size—6.66; 25% 
maximal IV size—5.53. 
 
 IV= Percent independent board members IV= Compensation committee independence IV= CEO-chairman duality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable 
DV = Pay–for-    
performance    
DV = CSR 
DV = Pay–for-   
performance 
DV = CSR DV = Pay-for-performance DV = CSR 
Instrumental variable 0.0011***  0.0011***  -0.043***  
 (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.010)  
Pay-for-performance  4.145***  3.355***  3.368*** 
(predicted from first stage)  (1.012)  (1.099)  (1.199) 
Ln(Assets) 0.031* 0.321*** -0.030* 0.648*** 0.0256* 0.301*** 
 (0.016) (0.0910) (0.016) (0.0848) (0.0145) (0.0802) 
Largest owner shares 0.0003 0.00176 -0.0008 0.00193 -0.0004 0.00555*** 
 (0.0005) (0.00265) (0.0006) (0.00329) (0.0004) (0.00213) 
Tobin’s q -0.035*** 0.198** -0.026** 0.188*** -0.026** 0.170** 
 (0.013) (0.0786) (0.013) (0.0706) (0.011) (0.0662) 
ROA 0.005*** -0.0206** 0.004*** -0.00344 0.004*** -0.0134* 
 (0.001) (0.00807) (0.0012) (0.00754) (0.001) (0.00761) 
Interest coverage 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0005* 0.00222 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.00141) (0.0003) (0.00147) (0.0002) (0.0011) 
Current ratio -0.007** 0.0219 -0.011*** 0.0278 -0.006* 0.0182 
 (0.003) (0.0175) (0.003) (0.0204) (0.003) (0.0160) 
Ln(GDP per capita) 0.340*** 0.0575 0.165** 0.971** 0.251*** 0.310 
 (0.067) (0.493) (0.071) (0.419) (0.059) (0.426) 
Globalization 0.018*** 0.0246 -0.020*** 0.147*** 0.011*** 0.0637*** 
 (0.003) (0.0248) (0.005) (0.0335) (0.003) (0.0195) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  7,871  6,797  8,967 
R-squared  0.747  0.772  0.772 
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Cragg-Donald F-test statistics 29.12  20.61  17.87  
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Table 7. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive pay-for-performance: robustness with alternative dependent variables (DVs) and CSR 
Samples 
     The table shows the results of CSR and executive pay-for-performance from two – stage least squares estimations using the independent 
variable IV approach. The setup is similar to Table 6, but only the second stage results for the main explanatory variable are shown for conciseness. 
The dependent variable in the first stage is a dummy variable, pay-for-performance, which indicates whether executive pay is linked to total shareholder 
return (TSR) and is measured using Thomson Reuter‘s ASSET4 data category ―CEO Compensation Link to TSR‖. This variable is based on a 
textual analysis from companies‘ annual reports. The IV for pay-for-performance is the percentage of independent board members (Percent 
independent board members). The control variables are Ln(Assets), Largest shareholder’s ownership, Tobin’s q, ROA, Interest coverage, Current ratio, Ln(GDP per 
capita), and Globalization. All regressions control for firm and time fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 Panel A. IVA – RiskMetrics sample Panel B. Vigeo ESG sample 
 DV = EcoValue 
rating 
(environment) 
DV = Social rating DV = 
Environment score 
DV = Human 
resources score 
DV=Customers & 
suppliers score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pay–for–performance  2.840*** 1.431** 31.99** 32.25* 40.45* 
(predicted from first stage) (0.922) (0.691) (9.616) (18.16) (24.27) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 9,276 12,487 2,631  2,631 2,631 
R-squared 0.789 0.798 0.983 0.787 0.618 
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Table 8. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and excess pay: two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations 
     The table shows the results of CSR and excess pay from 2SLS estimations. The dependent variable in the first stage is the CEO‘s total compensation, which is regressed 
on Tobin’s q, return on assets (ROA), firm size, CEO–chairman duality, the degree of entrenchment (E-index), a dummy variable capturing whether say-on-pay is sought, board size, 
the independence of board members, the independence of the compensation committee, and blockholder ownership (the percent of equity held by all blockholders who own more than 
5% of the firm‘s shares). The residual of the first stage is called excess pay and is an explanatory variable of CSR (the overall IVA rating from MSCI‘s Intangible Value 
Assessment database) in stage two, which also includes the following variables: Tobin’s q (winsorized at 5%), ROA (winsorized at 5%), firm size, largest shareholder ownership 
stake (percent), interest coverage, current ratio, ln(GDP per capita), and a country level globalization index. All independent variables are one-year lagged. All regressions control for 
firm and time fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
DV = Ln(CEO pay) (in US dollars) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 First stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
First stage 
Second 
stage 
Explanatory variable (lagged) DV = Ln(Pay) DV = CSR DV = Ln(Pay) DV = CSR DV = Ln(Pay) DV = CSR DV = Ln(Pay) DV = CSR 
Excess pay  -0.0451*  -0.0430*  -0.0357  -0.0574** 
  (0.0241)  (0.0241)  (0.0242)  (0.0257) 
Tobin’s q 0.212*** 0.238*** 0.212*** 0.238*** 0.210*** 0.234*** 0.245*** 0.178** 
 
(0.0242) (0.0688) (0.0242) (0.0689) (0.0242) (0.0690) (0.0255) (0.0819) 
ROA -0.0025 0.0143** -0.0023 0.0144** -0.00235 0.0144** -0.0027 0.0104 
 
(0.0020) (0.0064) (0.0020) (0.0064) (0.0019) (0.0064) (0.0020) (0.0067) 
Ln(Assets) 0.180*** 0.620*** 0.181*** 0.621*** 0.174*** 0.620*** 0.239*** 0.613*** 
 
(0.0265) (0.0847) (0.0265) (0.0847) (0.0266) (0.0847) (0.0271) (0.0906) 
CEO–chairman duality 0.165***  0.165***  0.170***  0.121***  
 
(0.0266)  (0.0266)  (0.0268)  (0.0279)  
Entrenchment index 0.0154  0.0169  0.0176  0.00429  
 
(0.0118)  (0.0118)  (0.0119)  (0.0123)  
Say–on–pay  
 
 -0.0877***  
 
 -0.0524*  
  
 (0.0300)  
 
 (0.0301)  
Ln(Board size) 
 
   0.0848*  0.0767  
  
   (0.0468)  (0.0496)  
Independence of board members 
 
   
 
 -0.234×10-3  
  
   
 
 (0.419×10-3)  
Compensation committee 
 
   
 
 -0.179***  
  
   
 
 (0.0447)  
Blockholder ownership 
 
   
 
 0.0165  
  
   
 
 (0.0170)  
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Largest shareholder’s ownership  -0.0007  -0.0008  -0.0002  0.0031 
  (0.0031)  (0.0031)  (0.0031)  (0.0036) 
Interest coverage  -0.0017  -0.0017  -0.0016  -0.0013 
  (0.0016)  (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0018) 
Current ratio  -0.0048  -0.0047  -0.0048  -0.0038 
  (0.0125)  (0.0125)  (0.0125)  (0.0140) 
Ln(GDP per capita)  1.630***  1.633***  1.626***  2.055*** 
  (0.415)  (0.415)  (0.415)  (0.446) 
Globalization index  0.0297  0.0299  0.0280  0.0828** 
  (0.0318)  (0.0318)  (0.0318)  (0.0337) 
Constant 10.08*** -29.54*** 10.06*** -29.60*** 9.982*** -29.34*** 8.666*** -38.48*** 
 
(0.459) (5.738) (0.459) (5.741) (0.466) (5.746) (0.770) (6.152) 
  
   
 
 
 
 
Number of observations 14,153 3,599 14,153 3,599 14,106 3,598 12,187 3,060 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 70.32% 89.27% 70.30% 89.27% 70.23% 89.27% 73.13% 90.04% 
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Table 9. Direct effects of legal protection of shareholder rights on CSR 
     The dependent variables are various environmental, social, and governance (ESG) indices, and the key explanatory variables are the adjusted anti-director rights index 
(ADRI), anti-self-dealing index (ASDI), and the public enforcement of the anti-self-dealing regulation. Control variables are legal origins (French, German, and Scandinavian; 
the English origin is taken as benchmark and omitted from regressions), logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, return on assets (ROA) (winsorized at 5%), 
Tobin‘s q (winsorized at 5%), financial constraints, interest coverage, current ratio, an ownership dispersion indicator, investment opportunities, and year and industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and reported in the parentheses. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall ratings and subdimensional ratings) from the MSCI IVA sample 
 IVA rating EcoValue rating Social rating Labor relations Industry-specific carbon risks Environmental opportunities 
Adjusted ADRI 0.297***   0.333***   0.269***   0.243***   0.221***   0.151***   
 (0.110)   (0.060)   (0.055)   (0.070)   (0.053)   (0.046)   
ASDI  1.329   1.966***   1.184   1.003   1.302**   0.967***  
  (1.325)   (0.676)   (1.174)   (0.940)   (0.489)   (0.307)  
Public 
enforcement 
  0.753***   0.158   0.725***   0.523***   0.004   -0.018 
   (0.229)   (0.211)   (0.208)   (0.169)   (0.202)   (0.128) 
Number of 
observations 
25,449 25,549 25,549 48,858 48,958 48,958 32,495 32,483 32,483 32,504 32,604 32,604 40,508 40,606 40,606 47,976 48,075 48,075 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 13.5% 12.2% 12.9% 18.3% 17.5% 16.3% 10.7% 9.5% 10.4% 14.0% 13.2% 13.5% 41.3% 41.6% 41.2% 27.3% 27.2% 27.0% 
Panel B. Dependent variables are ESG ratings (overall and subdimensional ratings) from the Vigeo corporate ESG sample 
 Overall ESG Environment Human resources Customers and suppliers Human rights Community involvement 
Adjusted ADRI 1.969***   2.789***   3.363***   0.980   2.558***   2.622***   
 (0.585)   (0.520)   (1.123)   (0.674)   (0.811)   (0.762)   
ASDI  -5.395   7.104   0.665   -3.116   -4.828   -7.227  
  (9.169)   (10.904)   (11.472)   (9.148)   (9.046)   (10.608)  
Public 
enforcement 
  -0.323   -2.337   0.698   -1.623   0.908   1.325 
   (1.516)   (1.711)   (2.255)   (1.376)   (1.688)   (1.384) 
Number of 
observations 
3,586 3,610 3,610 3,586 3,610 3,610 3,586 3,610 3,610 3,586 3,610 3,610 3,586 3,610 3,610 3,586 3,610 3610 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 33.8% 32.2% 32.2% 28.5% 27.3% 27.4% 41.7% 39.7% 39.8% 18.7% 18.2% 18.3% 24.5% 23.0% 23.0% 27.7% 26.7% 26.7% 
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Table 10. Direct effects of large shareholders‘ ownership and control on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
     The dependent variables are various environmental, social, and governance (ESG) indices from the ASSET4 sample, and the key explanatory variables are the largest shareholder‘s cash 
flow rights (ownership) and its square and the wedge between the largest shareholder‘s voting rights and cash flow rights. Wedge1 stands for voting rights minus cash flow rights, and 
Wedge2 stands for the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights. Control variables are market-to-book ratio of equity (winsorized at 5%), the logarithm of total assets (size), the logarithm of 
firm age, annual sales growth rate (winsorized at 1%), and CapEx – to – sales ratio (winsorized at 1%). All regressions control for country, industry, and time fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** stand for significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Dependent variables are ESG ratings from the ASSET4 sample 
 
Overall CSR rating Environmental rating Social rating 
Ownership and control             
Wedge1 (Voting / Cash flow rights) -0.118***  -0.089**  -0.072**  -0.066*  -0.088***  -0.079**  
 
(0.032)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.031)  (0.035)  
Wedge2 (Voting / Cash flow rights)  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0004) 
Largest shareholder‘s ownership -0.274*** -0.278*** -0.310*** -0.315*** -0.223*** -0.215*** -0.234*** -0.232*** -0.175*** -0.181*** -0.223*** -0.226*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.073) (0.073) (0.053) (0.054) (0.079) (0.078) (0.054) (0.054) (0.076) (0.076) 
Largest shareholder‘s ownership square 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.001) ()0.001 
Control variables             
Equity market-to-book 0.129 0.121 0.375** 0.376** -0.046 -0.052 0.352* 0.350* 0.168 0.162 0.470** 0.472** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.189) (0.189) (0.132) (0.132) (0.181) (0.182) (0.135) (0.136) (0.197) (0.198) 
Log(Size)   7.261*** 7.265***   7.689*** 7.691***   7.195*** 7.199*** 
   (0.486) (0.486)   (0.462) (0.461)   (0.474) (0.473) 
Log(Age)   3.940*** 3.962***   2.647*** 2.657***   2.919*** 2.945*** 
   (0.614) (0.615)   (0.607) (0.607)   (0.617) (0.617) 
Annual sales growth rate   0.002 0.002   -0.015*** -0.015***   -0.013** -0.013** 
   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.006) 
CapEx – to – sales ratio   -0.077** -0.077**   0.012 0.012   -0.048 -0.048 
   (0.034) (0.033)   (0.040) (0.040)   (0.038) (0.037) 
Constant   -64.214*** -64.822***   -44.976*** -45.233***   -39.148*** -39.790*** 
   (7.664) (7.665)   (8.071) (8.046)   (7.384) (7.372) 
Number of Observations 18,905 18,894 9,064 9,060 19,467 19,456 9,193 9,189 19,467 19,456 9,193 9,189 
Country, industry, year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 20.5% 20.4% 42.0% 41.8% 28.3% 28.3% 45.1% 45.0% 24.2% 24.2% 41.9% 41.8% 
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Table 11. Corporate social responsibility (CSR), entrenchment, and firm value: ASSET4 sample 
     The dependent variable is Tobin‘s q (the ratio of equity market capitalization to equity book value) winsorized 
at 5% level for all regressions. Entrenchment Index 1 is the sum of the following dummy variables from 
Datastream: the presence of a poison pill, a golden parachute, a supermajority requirement for amending bylaws 
and charter, a classified board, and other anti-takeover provisions and treats non-available values as zeros. 
Entrenchment Index 2 has the same composition as Entrenchment Index 1, except that classified board (directors‘ 
terms can be different) is replaced by staggered board (directors‘ terms are uniform). CSR is measured by 
ASSET4‘s overall CSR rating for Columns 1 – 2, ASSET4‘s aggregate environmental rating for Columns 3 – 4, 
and ASSET4‘s aggregate social rating for Columns 5 – 6. All specifications include country, industry, and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** stand for 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
The world sample: Dependent variable = Tobin’s q 
 Overall CSR Rating Environmental Rating Social Rating 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Entrenchment Index 1 -0.0767**  -0.0707***  -0.0780***  
 (0.0318)  (0.0274)  (0.0299)  
Entrenchment Index 2  -0.0689**  -0.0618**  -0.0805*** 
  (0.0296)  (0.0254)  (0.0275) 
CSR 0.0021** 0.0022** 0.0005 0.0007 0.0016* 0.0014 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.001) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
CSR × Entrenchment Index 0.0011** 0.0008* 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Log(Assets) -0.2775*** -0.2772*** -0.2694*** -0.2692*** -0.2784*** -0.2784*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0275) (0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0280) 
Largest shareholder‘s ownership 0.0017 0.0015 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 0.0008 
 (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Largest shareholder‘s ownership 
square 
-0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Leverage 0.0008 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Dividend per share -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ROE 0.0227 0.0226 0.0230 0.0229 0.0229 0.0229 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 16,077 16,077 16,278 16,278 16,278 16,278 
R-squared 25.4% 25.4% 25.0% 25.0% 25.3% 25.3% 
 
  
 57 
 
Table 0A1. MSCI intangible value assessment data description 
IVA factor IVA subscore 
Weig
ht 
Key metrics 
Strategic 
governance 
SG1—Strategy    < 2% Overall governance; rating composed of total scores of non-key 
issues  
SG2—Strategic  
capability  
< 2% Management of corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues, 
partnership in multi-stakeholder initiatives  
SG3—Traditional 
governance concerns  
< 2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board diversity, 
compensation practices, controversies involving executive 
compensation and governance 
Human capital HC1—Workplace 
Practices  
< 2% Workforce diversity, policies and programs to promote diversity, 
work/life benefits, discrimination-related controversies 
HC2—Labor relations 20% KEY ISSUE: Labor relations  
Benefits, strikes, union relations, controversies, risk of work 
stoppages, etc. 
HC3—Health and 
safety  
< 2% Health and safety policies and systems, implementation and 
monitoring of those systems, performance (injury rate, etc.), 
safety-related incidents and controversies 
Stakeholder 
capital 
SC1—Stakeholder 
partnerships  
< 2% Customer initiatives, customer-related controversies, firm‘s 
support for public policies with noteworthy benefits for 
stakeholders  
SC2—Local 
communities  
< 2% Policies, systems, and initiatives involving local communities 
(especially indigenous peoples), controversies related to firm‘s 
interactions with communities  
SC3—Supply chain < 2% Policies and systems to protect supply-chain workers‘ and 
contractors‘ rights, initiatives toward improving labor conditions, 
supply-chain-related controversies  
Products and 
services 
PS1—Intellectual 
capital and product 
development  
< 2% Beneficial products and services, including efforts that benefit the 
disadvantaged, reduce consumption of energy and resources, and 
production of hazardous chemicals; average of two scores  
PS2—Product safety  < 2% Product quality, health and safety initiatives, controversies related 
to the quality or safety of a firm‘s products, including legal cases, 
recalls, criticism  
Emerging 
markets 
EM1—EM strategy  < 2% Default = 5, unless company – specific exposure is highly 
significant   
EM2—Human rights 
and child and forced 
labor  
< 2% Policies, support for values in Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, initiatives to promote human rights, human rights 
controversies  
EM3—Oppressive 
regimes  
<2% Controversies, substantive involvement in countries with poor 
human rights records  
Environmental 
risk factors 
ER1—Historic 
liabilities 
< 2% Controversies including natural resource – related cases, 
widespread or egregious environmental impacts  
ER2—Operating risk < 2% Emissions to air, discharges to water, emission of toxic chemicals, 
nuclear energy, controversies involving non – greenhouse gas 
emissions  
ER3—Leading and  
sustainability risk 
indicators  
< 2% Water management and use, use of recycled materials, sourcing, 
sustainable resource management, climate change policy and 
transparency, climate change initiatives, absolute and normalized 
emissions output, controversies  
ER4—Industry 25% KEY ISSUE: Carbon 
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carbon specific risk  Targets, emissions intensity relative to peers, estimated cost of 
compliance  
Environmental 
management 
capacity 
EMC1—
Environmental 
strategy 
< 2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all 
operations, environmental management systems, regulatory 
compliance, controversies  
EMC2—Corporate 
governance  
< 2% Board independence, management of CSR issues, board diversity, 
compensation practices, controversies involving executive 
compensation and governance  
EMC3—
Environmental 
management systems  
< 2% Establishment and monitoring of environmental performance 
targets, presence of environmental training, stakeholder 
engagement  
EMC4—Audit < 2% External independent audits of environmental performance  
EMC5—
Environmental 
accounting and 
reporting  
< 2% Reporting frequency, reporting quality  
EMC6— 
Environmental 
training and 
eevelopment  
< 2% Presence of environmental training and communications 
programs for employees  
EMC7—Certification < 2% Certifications by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) or other industry- and country-specific 
third – party auditors  
EMC8—Products and 
materials  
< 2% Positive and negative impact of products and services, end-of-life 
product management, controversies related to environmental 
impact of products and services.  
Environmental 
opportunity 
factors 
EO1—Strategic 
competence  
< 2% Policies to integrate environmental considerations into all 
operations and reduce environmental impact of operations, 
products and services, environmental management systems, 
regulatory compliance  
EO2—Environmental 
opportunity  
35% KEY ISSUE: Opportunities in clean technology  
Product development in clean technology, research and 
development relative to sales and trend, innovation capacity   
EO3—performance < 2% Percent of revenue represented by identified beneficial products 
and services  
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Table 0A2. Vigeo corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) data 
description 
Key domain 
Sub-
dimension 
Description 
Environment ENV1.1 Environmental strategy and eco-design 
 ENV1.2 Pollution prevention and control 
 ENV1.3 Development of green products and services 
 ENV1.4 Protection of biodiversity 
 ENV2.1 Protection of water resources 
 ENV2.2 Minimizing environmental impacts from energy use 
 ENV2.3 Environmental supply – chain management 
 ENV2.4 Management of atmospheric emissions 
 ENV2.5 Waste management 
 ENV2.6 Management of environmental nuisances: dust, odor, noise 
 ENV2.7 Management of environmental impacts from transportation 
 ENV3.1 Management of environmental impacts from the use and disposal of 
products and services 
Human 
resources 
HRS1.1 Promotion of labor relations 
HRS1.2 Encouraging employee participation 
 HRS2.1 Career development 
 HRS2.2 Training and development 
 HRS2.3 Responsible management of restructurings 
 HRS2.4 Career management and promotion of employability 
 HRS3.1 Quality of remuneration systems 
 HRS3.2 Improvement of health and safety conditions 
 HRS3.3 Respect and management of working hours 
Business 
behavior 
C&S1.1 Product safety 
C&S1.2 Information to customers 
(Customer and 
supplier) 
C&S1.3 Responsible Contractual Agreement 
C&S2.1 Integration of corporate social responsibility in purchasing processes 
 C&S2.2 Sustainable Relationship with suppliers 
 C&S2.3 Integration of environmental factors in the supply chain 
 C&S2.4 Integration of social factors in the supply chain 
 C&S3.1 Prevention of corruption 
 C&S3.2 Prevention of anticompetitive practices 
 C&S3.3 Transparency and integrity of influence strategies and practices 
Human rights HR1.1 Respect for human rights standards and prevention of violations 
 HR2.1 Respect for freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
 HR2.2 Elimination of child labor 
 HR2.3 Abolition of forced labor 
 HR2.4 Nondiscrimination 
Community 
involvement 
CIN1.1 Promotion of social and economic development 
CIN2.1 Social impacts of company‘s products and services 
 CIN2.2 Contribution to general interest causes 
Corporate 
governance 
CGV1.1 Board of directors 
CGV2.1 Audit and internal controls 
 CGV3.1 Shareholders‘ rights 
 CGV4.4 Executive remuneration 
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Table 0A3. MSCI intangible value assessment (IVA) country (region) coverage 
Country IVA rating  EcoValue 
21 rating 
Social 
rating 
Firm-year 
obs. 
Firm obs. Country IVA Rating EcoValue 
21 Rating 
Social 
Rating 
Firm-year 
obs. 
Firm obs. 
Australia 2.95 2.75 2.97 2,877 240 Morocco 1.00 0.67 1.33 3 1 
Austria 3.44 3.13 3.23 370 14 Netherlands 3.35 3.62 3.29 1,496 34 
Belgium 2.98 2.97 3.00 680 19 New Zealand 2.70 2.95 2.97 256 13 
Bermuda Islands 2.02 1.35 2.06 283 16 Norway 4.06 4.35 3.94 485 16 
Brazil 2.68 3.28 2.68 
 
426 33 Pakistan 1.50 1.25 1.75 4 2 
Canada 3.24 2.87 3.26 3,347 129 Papua New Guinea 2.62 2.00 3.05 21 2 
Cayman Islands 2.60 1.94 2.95 101 3 Peru 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 1 
Chile 1.59 1.50 1.72 46 9 Philippines 0.04 0.89 0.04 28 1 
China 0.54 0.46 0.63 181 35 Poland 2.03 1.55 1.76 194 7 
Colombia 2.00 2.67 2.33 3 2 Portugal 2.67 2.60 2.12 451 11 
Cyprus 4.00 3.00 4.00 5 1 Puerto Rico 1.06 1.53 1.06 32 1 
Czech Republic 2.43 2.38 2.73 124 22 Romania 1.00 0.78 1.00 23 1 
Denmark 3.43 3.31 3.33 
 
843 22 Russia 0.79 0.64 1.07 227 19 
Egypt 1.71 0.76 1.65 17 3 Singapore 2.03 2.08 2.08 740 40 
Finland 3.85 3.78 
 
3.84 927 27 South Africa 4.26 3.50 4.33 167 17 
France 3.95 3.39 3.62 3,660 89 Spain 3.48 3.08 3.45 1,610 45 
Germany 3.83 4.06 3.74 2,779 66 Sweden 4.19 4.09 4.11 1,600 42 
Greece 2.23 2.05 2.14 554 16 Switzerland 3.18 3.10 3.11 3,184 60 
Hong Kong 1.79 1.96 1.92 1,447 62 Taiwan 2.15 2.04 2.19 156 17 
Hungary 1.74 1.83 1.63 95 4 Thailand 2.53 1.04 2.58 82 6 
India 2.03 1.66 2.09 150 26 Turkey 2.20 1.13 2.04 109 7 
Indonesia 1.47 0.53 1.59 34 4 United Arab Emirates 1.00 3.00 1.00 1 1 
Ireland 1.89 2.09 1.88 892 24 United Kingdom 3.62 3.24 3.52 14,203 315 
Israel 1.09 1.64 1.09 78 11 United States 2.38 2.44 2.45 31,819 778 
Italy 
 
2.31 1.99 2.33 2149 54       
Japan 2.57 3.67 2.59 11,270 384 (Not included in the World Bank data)  
South Korea 2.59 2.96 2.61 466 28 British Virgin Islands 1.00 2.00 0.00 1 1 
Luxembourg 1.96 2.65 1.99 145 9 Guernsey 2.03 1.28 1.80 87 2 
Macao 2.00 4.00 1.50 2 2 Gibraltar 3.00 2.48 3.09 23 2 
Malaysia 1.47 1.18 1.90 154 14 Jersey 1.27 1.08 1.31 26 3 
Mexico 2.05 2.69 2.18 239 17 (Total: 59 countries)    91,373  
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Table 0A4.Vigeo environmental, social, and governance (ESG) country (region) coverage 
Country Overall ESG 
score 
Environmental 
score 
Human 
resources 
score 
Human 
rights score 
Community 
involvement score 
Customers and 
suppliers score 
Corporate 
governance score 
Firm year 
observations 
Firm 
observations 
Australia 34.91 25.12 22.08 34.71 32.86 37.69 56.72 154 72 
Austria 28.72 23.95 29.32 35.22 29.40 32.02 40.28 57 16 
Belgium 35.45 36.78 38.65 38.49 39.10 41.28 41.25 120 22 
Bermuda 30.00 21.00 33.00 38.00 55.00 19.00 39.00 1 1 
China 14.80 4.80 6.20 20.60 25.60 23.60 22.00 5 3 
Canada 35.20 26.29 24.70 37.53 38.07 41.45 51.54 133 52 
Denmark 29.60 27.62 29.59 36.18 30.75 35.76 34.30 97 27 
Finland 40.15 40.49 41.72 42.55 33.24 42.37 50.89 123 24 
France 42.40 41.22 47.18 48.15 47.53 45.91 43.66 1038 121 
Germany 40.55 43.29 43.91 46.25 42.25 44.37 45.11 508 75 
Greece 27.61 26.54 27.81 30.10 33.32 34.37 29.67 57 12 
Hong Kong 23.36 15.22 15.31 25.05 22.50 27.06 35.53 96 43 
Iceland 21.50 5.75 8.00 22.25 9.75 33.75 39.00 4 4 
Ireland 27.08 22.85 25.59 30.04 31.95 35.07 51.56 97 18 
Italy 36.75 34.28 40.97 41.62 39.85 42.94 12.09 291 52 
Japan 25.19 27.47 19.39 31.87 26.25 33.46 16.37 655 290 
Luxembourg 33.31 29.03 35.90 40.00 43.30 40.57 44.60 30 5 
Netherlands 42.65 43.19 42.35 45.35 47.67 48.55 53.85 288 47 
New Zealand 29.43 28.86 17.43 27.14 19.86 29.14 48.86 7 3 
Norway 40.94 34.00 39.90 48.14 38.96 41.10 51.60 67 19 
Portugal 35.86 35.15 37.90 37.60 42.97 43.08 36.00 61 10 
Russia 32.00 31.00 20.00 18.00 16.00 43.00 56.00 2 1 
Singapore 25.62 16.16 14.35 23.84 23.84 27.89 44.19 37 17 
Spain 36.52 36.40 38.60 40.91 40.85 41.97 41.87 259 51 
Sweden 37.10 35.76 32.99 45.71 32.41 42.29 42.08 194 43 
Switzerland 37.02 35.79 32.45 40.49 36.04 40.72 44.44 301 54 
United Kingdom 42.24 39.47 33.14 42.04 45.85 42.65 64.77 1,157 255 
United States 32.69 23.57 18.37 37.28 33.59 38.58 49.86 1,209 449 
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Table 0A5. ASSET4 environmental, social, and governance (ESG) country (region) coverage 
Country 
Overall CSR 
rating 
Environmental 
rating 
Social 
rating 
Firm year 
observations 
Firm 
observations 
Country 
Overall 
CSR rating 
Environmental 
rating 
Social 
rating 
Firm-year 
obs. 
Firm obs. 
Abu Dhabi (UAE) 19.65 38.32 25.68 12 1 Kuwait 18.92 24.30 36.60 48 4 
Austria 43.29 38.13 38.77 4,020 335 Luxembourg 55.00 58.48 52.83 60 5 
Australia 44.46 51.84 50.40 252 21 Malaysia 42.32 41.12 50.21 540 45 
Belgium 53.16 54.88 49.63 336 28 Mexico 38.96 46.03 49.47 324 27 
Brazil 55.02 55.19 67.72 1,008 84 Morocco 21.57 20.13 53.42 36 3 
Canada 47.59 37.64 38.65 3,864 322 Netherlands 75.30 68.86 75.36 540 45 
Channel Islands 52.05 49,82 53.02 24 2 New Zealand 49.47 45.42 42.40 144 12 
Chile 33.41 43.66 45.61 252 21 Nigeria 7.18 10.89 19.71 12 1 
China 25.59 33.38 32.78 984 82 Norway 56.90 55.26 58.87 300 25 
Colombia 34.40 34.52 40.94 108 9 Oman 27.00 27.42 33.00 12 1 
Cyprus 39.18 30.20 36.71 12 1 Peru 41.33 31.05 34.41 12 1 
Czech Republic 48.56 48.72 60.01 48 4 Philippines 39.59 36.07 40.79 252 21 
Denmark  48.45 56.43 52.69 324 27 Poland 33.22 33.62 42.06 312 26 
Dubai 37.39 44.24 33.76 12 1 Portugal 67.52 66.20 73.95 144 12 
Egypt 14.55 19.29 27.22 132 11 Qatar 10.77 12.87 24.64 24 2 
Finland 72.26 73.25 66.86 324 27 Russian Federation 37.52 39.92 50.64 408 34 
France 71.45 75.70 76.36 1,212 101 Saudi Arabia 19.22 32.12 25.65 72 6 
Germany 58.25 67.07 67.16 1,068 89 Singapore 34.66 33.58 35.60 648 54 
Greece 35.42 47.10 49.62 300 25 South Africa 66.17 56.74 73.06 1,092 91 
Hong Kong 30.27 33.72 35.51 1,800 150 South Korea 47.12 62.00 56.77 1,212 101 
Hungary 73.29 76.18 80.80 48 4 Spain 66.26 68.54 73.82 696 58 
Iceland 29.02 20.45 36.06 36 3 Sri Lanka 51.25 51.09 66.59 12 1 
India 47.16 51.60 57.93 960 80 Sweden 62.79 66.58 63.91 660 55 
Indonesia 45.46 41.95 60.83 300 25 Switzerland 57.88 58.71 56.98 852 71 
Ireland 43.04 42.65 39.33 216 18 Taiwan  29.02 44.74 36.30 1,536 128 
Israel 38.44 42.65 39.33 168 14 Thailand 55.76 47.93 56.73 264 22 
Italy  52.92 53.05 62.93 708 59 Turkey 44.33 48.36 52.90 288 24 
Japan  38.18 61.62 45.47 5,196 433 United Kingdom 64.32 59.63 63.16 4,776 398 
Jordan 52.16 60.71 62.99 12 1 United States 51.91 40.22 44.17 14,436 1203 
Kazakhstan 34.92 15.74 27.17 12 1 Zimbabwe 11.75 38.42 35.57 12 1 
 
